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THE REAL STORY BEHIND THE  
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S 
IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 5 OF 
THE VRA: VIGOROUS  ENFORCEMENT, 
AS INTENDED BY CONGRESS 
MARK A. POSNER* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
his year, Congress is expected to reauthorize one of our Nation’s 
most prominent and effective civil rights statutes, Section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act,1 and the President is expected to sign the 
renewal legislation.  Section 5 requires a subset of states and local 
jurisdictions to obtain federal approval (“preclearance”) from the 
Department of Justice or the District Court for the District of 
Columbia before implementing any change in their voting practices 
and procedures.  This requirement is aimed at ensuring that covered 
jurisdictions do not implement any voting changes that are 
discriminatory in either purpose or effect.  Section 5 is currently set 
to expire on August 6, 2007.2 
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 1. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(8) (2000). 
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The reauthorization of Section 5 is expected, in turn, to set the 
stage for an historic decision by the Supreme Court as to whether 
Section 5 continues to represent a  constitutional exercise of 
Congress’ Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment authority to remedy 
discrimination in voting.  The continued constitutionality of Section 
5 is in doubt for several reasons.  First, the statute exacts a substantial 
federalism cost due to the fact that, unlike any other federal statute, it 
requires covered states and localities to obtain federal approval 
before they are allowed to implement certain new enactments, i.e., 
enactments relating to voting.  Second, federalism has become a 
major concern of many of the Justices, with respect to Section 5 in 
particular and with respect to federal-state relations in general.3  
Third, there is a tension between the Supreme Court’s recent line of 
cases limiting the use of race when devising redistricting plans4 and 
the race-conscious analyses required by Section 5.  Fourth, the 
Supreme Court recently has adopted a more stringent test for 
determining the constitutionality of Congress’ exercise of its 
remedial authority under the Fourteenth Amendment.5  Lastly, the 
voting discrimination problems that led Congress to enact Section 5 
in 1965, and then reauthorize the statute on three occasions 
thereafter, have substantially moderated, in large part because of the 
 
 3. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000) (Section 5 raises 
“‘substantial’ federal costs” which, if exacerbated, could perhaps raise concerns about its 
constitutionality); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926–27 (1995) (same).  See also Bd. of Trustees 
of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360, 368 (2001) (Americans With Disabilities Act held 
unconstitutional insofar as it authorized money damages against states for violations of Title I of 
the Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act held unconstitutional insofar as it authorized money damages against states). 
The Supreme Court has twice rejected the claim that Section 5 unconstitutionally impinges on 
our federal system of government, although neither of these decisions is of recent vintage.  City of 
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 193 (1980); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 
(1966). 
 4. E.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 927–28; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657–58 (1993). 
 5. See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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efforts of the Justice Department and private parties to enforce 
Section 5 and the other provisions of the Voting Rights Act.6 
Lurking behind these issues, however, is another important 
question that has the potential for significantly influencing the 
Supreme Court’s assessment of the constitutionality of Section 5.  
That question, which is the subject of this Article, is whether the 
Justice Department can be trusted to carry out its preeminent role in 
enforcing Section 5 in a manner that is consistent with congressional 
intent.7 
In the past eleven years, the Supreme Court (or, more accurately, 
five of the nine Justices) has expressed deep dissatisfaction with the 
manner in which the Justice Department has exercised its 
enforcement discretion.  In 1995, the Court accused the Department 
of applying the Section 5 purpose standard in a near unconstitutional 
manner, by allegedly converting it into a requirement that covered 
jurisdictions draw the maximum possible number of majority-
minority election districts possible when enacting redistricting 
plans.8  That case did not directly concern the scope of the Section 5 
 
 6. The question of the constitutionality of a reauthorized Section 5 has received extensive 
attention in scholarly articles written in the past few years. See generally Richard L. Hasen, 
Congressional Power to Renew Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO 
St. L. J. 177 (2005); Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Once and Future 
Remedy?, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 225 (2003); Paul Winke, Why the Preclearance and Bailout 
Provisions of the Voting Rights Act Are Still a Constitutionally Proportionate Remedy, 28  N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 69 (2003); Victor Andres Rodriguez, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 After Boerne: The Beginning of the End of Preclearance?, 91 CAL. L. REV. 776 (2003); Pamela 
Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 725 (1998).  With regard to the impact of the Voting Rights Act on minority 
electoral opportunity, see, e.g., QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH (Chandler Davidson & 
Bernard Grofman eds., 1994). 
 7. As shown by the statistics cited infra, almost all preclearance requests are directed to the 
Justice Department, although Section 5 gives covered jurisdictions the option of seeking 
preclearance from either the Justice Department or the District Court for the District of 
Columbia. 
 8. Miller, 515 U.S. at 927. 
02__POSNER______KELLY EDIT.DOC 11/1/2007  3:35:24 PM 
 
VOL. 1 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2006 
 
? 82 ? 
purpose standard, and so the Court did not alter the standard itself at 
that time.  However, in a decision issued five years later,9 the Court 
did act to sharply restrict the purpose standard, apparently in part 
because of the Court’s distrust of the Justice Department’s 
willingness to fairly apply a broader standard.  The Court held that 
discriminatory purpose under Section 5 is not the same as 
disciminatory purpose under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments—i.e., a purpose to minimize or restrict minority 
elecotral opportunity—but, instead, has a highly specialized, esoteric 
and limited meaning—the intent to cause a retrogression in minority 
electoral opportunity.10  In so holding, the Court did not say that it 
was basing its ruling on its concern about the Justice Department’s 
enforcement practices.  But this concern appears to be the only 
explanation for the Court’s otherwise odd and  perplexing comment 
that a Section 5 purpose standard co-extensive with the Constitution 
possibly would raise “concerns about § 5’s constitutionality”11 
(assertedly because this somehow would exacerbate Section 5’s 
federalism costs).  This statement only makes sense if the Court was 
saying that the use of the constitutional purpose standard in Section 
5 is problematic because, in the view of the Court majority, it is a 
potentially dangerous, extra-constitutional weapon when placed in 
the hands of the Justice Department. 
Accordingly, if and when a challenge to the constitutionality of a 
reauthorized Section 5 reaches the Supreme Court, at least several of 
the Justices are likely to enter into their analysis of the constitutional 
issues with a distinctly negative view as to the manner in which the 
Section 5 preclearance mechanism operates.  Moreover, the Court 
 
 9. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000). 
 10. Id. at 321 
 11. Id. at 322. 
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may be faced with a renewed Section 5 requirement that includes the 
broader purpose standard that the Court rejected in 2000, since civil 
rights groups have made it a priority to legislatively reverse that 
decision.12   If Congress adopts this amendment, the Court then will 
be squarely faced with the question whether granting the Justice 
Department its previous broad authority undermines the 
constitutionality of the reauthorization. 
Previous scholarly efforts to assess the Justice Department’s 
enforcement approach have foundered in large part because of the 
difficulty that exists in obtaining information about the preclearance 
analyses utilized by the Department.13  Although the Justice 
Department sets forth the reasons underlying each preclearance 
denial (“objection”) in a public letter written to the submitting 
jurisdiction, these letters provide only limited information about the 
Justice Department’s analytic approaches because they are summary 
in nature and because each letter only addresses the particular 
changes that are under review.  Furthermore, the Department does 
not provide any explanation when it decides to preclear submitted 
voting changes (these decisions are announced in form letters that 
simply identify the submitted changes and state that an objection is 
not being interposed).14  As a result, relatively few evaluations have 
 
 12. American Civil Liberties Union, Promises to Keep: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act in 
2006, at 31–32, March 2006, available at http://www.aclu.org/images/asset_upload_file516_ 
24396.pdf. 
 13. As a member of the Voting Section of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division for 
fifteen years and a Section 5 supervisor for approximately ten years, this author is well versed in 
the analyses used by the Department and understands the difficulties persons outside the 
Department face in obtaining information about these analyses. 
 14.   The limited scope of the information provided by the Department’s objection letters 
also has been noted by other commentators.  Peyton McCrary, Christopher Seaman, & Richard 
Valelly, The End of Preclearance as We Knew It: How the Supreme Court Transformed Section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act, MICH. J. RACE & L. (forthcoming May 2006) (manuscript at 5–6); Hiroshi 
Motomura, Preclearance Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 61 N.C. L. REV. 189, 192 (1983). 
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been undertaken of the Justice Department’s Section 5 
decisionmaking, and (as is discussed infra) many of the evaluations 
that have been undertaken have rendered flawed judgments based on 
fragmentary information.  
This Article seeks to gain a deeper understanding of the Justice 
Department’s approach to enforcing Section 5, and to assess that 
approach accurately, by studying the patterns evidenced in the 
Department’s objection letters as a whole and linking these patterns 
to an analysis of the structure and content of the preclearance 
remedy designed by Congress.15  The Article concludes first that the 
Justice Department, historically, has vigorously carried out its 
Section 5 decisionmaking authority, by broadly interpreting the 
scope of the Section 5 nondiscrimination standards (within the 
bounds of relevant court decisions) and conducting stringent reviews 
of the evidence offered by covered jurisdictions in support of their 
submitted voting changes   Second, the Article concludes that the 
structure and scope of the Section 5 remedy are, to a large extent, 
responsible for the federal government’s vigorous administrative 
enforcement, and thus the Justice Department’s approach to 
enforcing Section 5 is precisely what Congress intended.  In sum, the 
Justice Department’s enforcement of Section 5 fully supports a ruling 
 
 15. This author, as well as a few other commentators, previously have used Justice 
Department objection letters as a group to analyze Department decisional patterns.  Mark A. 
Posner, Post-1990 Redistrictings and the Preclearance Requirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990S 80 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1998); McCrary, 
Seaman, & Valelly, supra note 14, at 7; Motomura, supra note 14, at 191–92.  Since 1965, the 
Department has issued approximately one thousand objection letters.  McCrary, Seaman, & 
Valelly, supra note 14, at 30.  Copies of these letters are on file with the author.  In addition to the 
letters, the Department maintains a list of all Section 5 objections, which this author also used in 
preparing this article.  Complete Listing of Objections Pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/obj_activ.htm [hereinafter 
Complete Listing of Section 5 Objections]. 
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by the Supreme Court that a reauthorized Section 5 is 
constitutional.16 
The Article begins, in Part I, by describing the special and often 
unique features of the Section 5 preclearance remedy.  This is 
followed, in Part II, by an overview of the Justice Department’s 
Section 5 decisions.  Part III considers the various assessments that 
previously have been offered regarding the Justice Department’s 
preclearance modus operandi—the Justice Department as the 
illegitimate advocate for minority voters; the Justice Department as 
the endorser of discriminatory changes; and the Justice Department 
as an above-the-fray, case-by-case problem-solver—and identifies 
important flaws in these assessments.  Finally, in Part IV, the Article 
sets forth the author’s view of the real story behind the Department’s 
preclearance decisionmaking.  The Article identifies the various ways 
in which the Department has evidenced a vigorous and forceful 
approach to enforcing Section 5, and links this evaluation with the 
discussion from Part I to explain why the Department’s enforcement 
approach is the product of, and fully in accord with, Congress’ design 
of the Section 5 remedy. 
II 
THE ELEMENTS OF THE  
SECTION 5 REMEDY AND ITS ENFORCEMENT SCHEME 
The framework which defines the nature and scope of the Section 
5 remedy, and which channels its enforcement, has two important 
 
 16. A separate question regarding the Justice Department’s approach in enforcing Section 5 
is whether the Department’s decisionmaking has been affected by partisan political interests.  
That question is addressed in a recent essay published by this author and is not addressed here.  
Mark A. Posner, The Politicization of Justice Department Decisionmaking Under Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act: Is it a Problem and What Should Congress Do?,  http://www.acslaw.org/files/ 
Section%205%20decisionmaking %201-30-06.pdf. 
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parts: the statutory provisions enacted by Congress, as construed by 
the courts; and the administrative provisions adopted by the agency 
designated by Congress to enforce the remedy, the United States 
Department of Justice. 
A. The Section 5 Statutory Framework 
The basic requirements of Section 5, as enacted by Congress, may 
be stated simply and succinctly.  The law requires that certain 
designated states and localities—located principally, but not entirely, 
in the South—obtain federal preclearance whenever they “enact or 
seek to administer”17 a change in any voting practice or procedure.  
Preclearance may be obtained from either the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia or the Attorney General.  To 
obtain preclearance, jurisdictions must demonstrate that the change 
does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of 
discriminating on the basis of race or color; a subset of the covered 
jurisdictions also must also demonstrate that the change does not 
have a discriminatory purpose or effect with respect to persons who 
are members of a “language minority group”18 (“persons who are 
American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives or of Spanish 
heritage”).19  Unless and until preclearance is obtained, the change is 
unlawful and cannot be implemented.20  Section 5 initially was 
enacted for a term of five years, and has been amended and extended 
 
 17. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000). 
 18. Id. § 1973b(f)(2). 
 19. Id. § 1973l(c)(3). 
 20. Lopez v. Monterey County, 519 U.S. 9, 20–22 (1996); Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 
652–53 (1991). 
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by Congress on three occasions since 1965, in 1970, 1975, and 1982.21  
As previously noted, it is currently due to expire in August 2007. 
Examined more closely, Section 5 is composed of a total of eight 
distinct requirements and provisions, many of which are unique or 
uncommon in American jurisprudence, and others which were 
written to provide broad and all-encompassing protection to 
minority citizens as they seek to participate on an equal basis in our 
Nation’s political processes.  Together, they give Section 5 its 
remarkable remedial power.  These include five structural 
innovations regarding the allocation of government authority and 
the application of Anglo-American jurisprudential principles; 
coverage provisions that define in a novel manner the jurisdictions 
subject to the preclearance requirement and sweep broadly to 
identify the voting practices that are covered; and nondiscrimination 
standards that, on their face, are broad and stringent in their 
requirements. 
Structural innovations: 
Most dramatically, Section 5 reverses one of the fundamental 
organizing principles of our federal model of government, that state 
and local enactments are presumed legal and enforceable under the 
Constitution and federal law unless and until a court  (or other 
legal body) determines that an enactment violates a standard or 
rule enacted by the national government, and prohibits its 
implementation.22 
 
 21. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, §§ 2, 5, 84 Stat. 314, 314–15 
(1970); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, §§ 204, 206, 405, 89 Stat. 402, 
402–05 (1975); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(8), 96 Stat. 
131, 133 (1982). 
 22. In 1966, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this exception to the federal 
model, but recognized that it represents “an uncommon exercise of congressional power.” South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966).  Justice Black, the lone dissenter, attacked 
Section 5 as constituting a “radical degradation of state power.” Id. at 360 (Black, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
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This reversal of the ordinary legal presumption is at the heart of 
the Section 5 remedy.  As explained by the Supreme Court, Congress 
determined that after “nearly a century of systematic resistance to the 
Fifteenth Amendment,” it was necessary to “shift the advantage of 
time and inertia” from those seeking to engage in discrimination to 
its victims.23  Thus, under the Section 5 regime, discriminators no 
longer can simply design and implement new methods of 
discrimination to stay a step ahead of legal or political challenges to 
an existing discriminatory practice.  They must pass each new 
provision through the federal preclearance screen. 
Section 5 also reverses one of the fundamental organizing 
principles of American jurisprudence, that a party challenging an 
action taken by another bears the burden of proof (risk of 
nonpersuasion) in demonstrating that the action is unlawful.  
Instead, Section 5 places the burden of proof on covered 
jurisdictions to demonstrate that their voting changes are 
nondiscriminatory.24 
This provision is closely related to the presumption of 
unlawfulness that the statute attaches to voting changes that covered 
jurisdictions enact or seek to administer.  In essence, Section 5 
defines the status quo as being the absence of any change and then, 
consistent with the usual system of American jurisprudence, requires 
the party seeking to alter the status quo, namely the covered 
jurisdictions, to bear the burden of proof. 
 
 23. Id. at 328. 
 24. Section 5 does not explicitly state that covered jurisdictions have the burden of proof in 
Section 5 preclearance lawsuits, but this clearly was understood to be the intent of the statute.  Id. 
at 328, 335.  The Attorney General’s regulations governing Section 5 administrative reviews 
likewise specify that jurisdictions that seek preclearance from the Justice Department bear the 
burden of proving that their voting changes are nondiscriminatory.  Procedures for the 
Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 C.F.R. § 51.52(a) (2005).  The 
Attorney General’s determination in this regard was upheld by the Supreme Court.  Georgia v. 
United States, 411 U.S. 526, 541 (1973). 
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Section 5 alters the typical allocation of authority among federal 
district courts by transferring the authority for deciding whether 
voting changes are discriminatory from district courts located in 
the covered jurisdictions (the courts that typically decide federal 
law challenges to the actions of state and local governments) to 
federal officials in our nation’s capital, Washington, D.C. 
Congress recognized that local federal judges often have close ties 
to the political establishment in the jurisdictions where they sit and 
that decisions made pursuant to Section 5 could affect the ability of 
incumbent officials to retain power as against persons who 
historically had been excluded from the political process.  Congress 
determined that these circumstances involved an unacceptable risk of 
biased decisionmaking by local judges.25 
Section 5 creates a novel power-sharing arrangement between the 
District Court for the District of Columbia and the Attorney 
General, whereby both are empowered to grant or deny 
preclearance to the voting changes that covered jurisdictions enact 
or seek to administer. 
The statute allows jurisdictions to obtain judgments about the 
lawfulness of their actions through the usual method of judicial 
review, by filing a declaratory judgment action in the District of 
Columbia Court naming the Attorney General (or the United States) 
as defendant.  In addition, however, Section 5 gives jurisdictions the 
ability to bypass the judicial process and go straight to the statutory 
defendant, the Attorney General, to obtain a legally binding 
 
 25. Congress had had specific experience in that regard.  In the years immediately preceding 
the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, it had sought to address voting discrimination in the 
South by enacting legislation that authorized the Justice Department to file suit in local district 
courts challenging discriminatory provisions.  Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 313–16.  The Justice 
Department’s efforts were frustrated in part by the ingenuity of the defendant jurisdictions and 
the proof problems posed by the lawsuits.  Id. at 314.  However, the Department also found it 
difficult to prevail because of the hostility of certain local district judges to the enfranchisement of 
black citizens.  DAVID GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., AND THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 22–23 (1978); Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the 
Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523, 548 (1973). 
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determination as to whether the voting change is lawful.  If the 
Attorney General grants preclearance, the Section 5 process is over 
and the change may be implemented; if the Attorney General 
interposes an objection, the change remains unenforceable but 
jurisdictions still, if they wish, may proceed with a preclearance 
lawsuit in the district court with no negative consequence in the 
litigation from the fact that the Attorney General objected.26 
As initially drafted, Section 5 only included the judicial 
preclearance mechanism, but Congress realized that an alternative, 
non-judicial mechanism was also needed because of the financial 
burdens associated with litigation.27  The obvious way to create a 
preclearance short-cut was to allow jurisdictions to go straight to the 
statutory defendant, the Attorney General, to request essentially a 
consent judgment that particular voting changes are not 
discriminatory. 
The Attorney General’s role also is special because of the fact that 
Congress did not grant minority voters any statutory role in the 
process.  The Attorney General is the sole statutory defendant in 
Section 5 declaratory judgment lawsuits (although minority voters 
may be allowed to intervene),28 and minority voters do not have a 
statutory role in the Attorney General’s administrative preclearance 
process (although the Attorney General encourages minority voters 
to comment about submitted changes).29  Furthermore, the Supreme 
 
 26. Preclearance lawsuits filed after a Justice Department objection are not litigated as 
reviews of the Department’s administrative action, and therefore are considered de novo.  Morris 
v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 505 n.21 (1977).  Thus, there is no presumption in post-objection 
preclearance suits that the Department’s determination was correct. 
 27. Id. at 503. 
 28. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 476–77 (2003). 
 29. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 
C.F.R. § 51.20 (2005). 
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Court has held that the Attorney General’s decisions to preclear 
voting changes may not be challenged in court by dissatisfied 
minority voters.30 
It should be noted that while Section 5’s power-sharing 
arrangement is unique, there is nothing remarkable about Congress’ 
choice of the Attorney General as the executive partner in this 
arrangement.  The Attorney General is the executive official that 
Congress designated to enforce previous federal provisions regarding 
the voting rights of minority citizens,31 who is the official responsible 
for enforcing other provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,32 and 
many other federal civil rights statutes.33 
Section 5 requires the Attorney General to make administrative 
preclearance decisions within a very short period of time – sixty 
days after a preclearance request is filed with the Attorney General 
by a covered jurisdiction—and if the Attorney General does not 
interpose an objection within the required time period, the change 
is precleared automatically.34 
The Attorney General was given this brief window of time to 
conduct Section 5 reviews because covered jurisdictions have a 
strong interest in promptly implementing their new voting 
provisions, and thus have a strong interest in obtaining expeditious 
reviews of their voting changes.35  The Attorney General has a limited 
ability to expand the review period by restarting the sixty-day 
 
 30. Morris, 432 U.S. at 507. 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2000). 
 32. Id. §§ 1973b, 1973d, 1973f, 1973g(c), 1973j(d), 1973aa-2. 
 33. Id. §§ 2000a-3 (discrimination in public accommodations), 2000b (discrimination in 
certain publicly owned facilities), 2000c-6 (discrimination in public education), 2000e-6 
(discrimination in public employment), 3610 (housing discrimination), 3612 (same), 3614 
(same), 12117 (discrimination on the basis of disability), 12134 (same), 12188 (same), 14141 
(police misconduct), 3789d (discrimination in programs receiving federal crime control funds). 
 34. Morris, 432 U.S. at 502. 
 35. Id. at 504. 
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statutory period when, in certain circumstances, a submitting 
jurisdiction provides additional information to the Attorney General 
after the initial submission is made.36  However, the Attorney General 
is not allowed to expand the review period to pursue any elaborate 
discovery, conduct a hearing, or simply to have additional time in 
which to decide close cases.37 
Coverage provisions: 
By its terms, Section 5 applies to a limited subset of states and local 
jurisdictions, unlike other anti-discrimination statutes, which have 
nationwide application.38 
Coverage is determined pursuant to a nondiscretionary formula, 
contained in Section 4 of the Act, which selects those states, as well as 
those local jurisdictions (typically, counties), that utilized 
discriminatory voting tests or devices at the time of the 1964, 1968, 
or 1972 elections and, consequently, had a comparatively low voter 
registration or turnout rate at that election. 39  Section 4 also provides 
that jurisdictions covered by the formula may “bail out” of coverage 
by demonstrating (in a lawsuit filed in the District of Columbia 
 
 36. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 
C.F.R. § 51.37 (2005) (additional information provided at the request of the Attorney General), id. 
§ 51.39 (supplemental information provided by the submitting jurisdiction or a related 
submission made by that jurisdiction).  The Attorney General’s authority to issue the first 
regulation was challenged and was upheld by the Supreme Court.  Georgia v. United States, 411 
U.S. 526, 541 (1973). 
 37. See generally Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, subpt. E (2005). 
 38. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000) (discrimination on the basis of sex in federally assisted programs 
or activities); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) (discrimination on the basis of disability in federally assisted 
programs or activities); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 (2000) (discrimination in voting), 1973 (same), 2000a 
(discrimination in public accommodations), 2000a-1 (discrimination required by state law), 
2000d (discrimination in federally assisted programs or activities), 2000e-2 (discrimination in 
public employment), 2000e-3 (same), 3604-06 (housing discrimination), 12112 (discrimination 
on the basis of disability), 12132 (same), 12182 (same), 3789d(c) (discrimination in programs 
receiving federal crime control funds). 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2000). 
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District Court) that the specific electoral circumstances in the 
jurisdiction are such that coverage is not justified.40 
Today, through the application of the coverage formula and the 
resolution of bail-out lawsuits, Section 5 applies to eight states in 
their entirety: Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas; and to substantial portions of 
three other states: New York (the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan), 
North Carolina (forty of the State’s one hundred counties), and 
Virginia (the entire State except eleven counties and independent 
cities).  It also applies to relatively small portions of California, 
Florida, Michigan, New Hampshire, and South Dakota.41 
Section 5 broadly applies to “any voting qualification or 
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with 
respect to voting” if and when the voting provision is changed.42 
The types of voting provisions covered by Section 5 include: 
redistrictings; election method changes (such as changes to at-large 
or district voting, the use of a majority-vote or plurality-vote 
requirement, and numbered posts or residency districts for at-large 
voting); changes in the number of elected officials; annexations and 
other boundary line changes that alter the voting constituency of a 
jurisdiction; changes in voter-registration standards and procedures; 
changes in polling place, early voting, and absentee voting 
procedures; precinct changes and polling location changes; changes 
of the languages in which voting materials and information are 
 
 40. See Paul F. Hancock and Lora L. Tredway, The Bailout Standard of the Voting Rights Act: 
An Incentive to End Discrimination, 17 URB. LAW. 379, 381–82 (1985) (providing a detailed 
explanation of the bail-out procedure). 
 41. The current list of jurisdictions covered by Section 5 is available at U.S. Department of 
Justice Civil Rights Division, Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/ 
sec_5/covered.htm (last visited March 14, 2006). 
 42. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000). 
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provided to the public; election date changes and the holding of 
special elections; and changes in candidate qualification standards 
and procedures.43 
Nondiscrimination Standards 
Section 5 prohibits both the implementation of voting changes that 
have a discriminatory purpose and changes that have a 
discriminatory effect.  On its face, this standard is all-
encompassing, stringent, and uncompromising, which reflects 
Congress’ determination to respond to “exceptional [historical] 
conditions” by utilizing an “uncommon exercise of congressional 
power” to fashion a “decisive” remedy.44 
Over time, however, the Supreme Court has substantially 
diminished the stringency of the nondiscrimination test.  Early on, in 
its 1976 decision in Beer v. United States, the Court held that the 
Section 5 effect standard means “retrogression.”45  Under this 
approach, the effect analysis is conducted by comparing minority 
voters’ electoral opportunity under the new and old provisions; only 
if the change worsens that opportunity will the change be deemed to 
have a prohibited effect.46  The Court rejected a broader test under 
which the effect standard would have been co-extensive with the 
constitutional test of minority vote dilution.47  Up until recently, the 
retrogression analysis has focused on the opportunity of minority 
 
 43. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 
C.F.R. § 51.13–.18 (2005). 
 44. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334–35 (1966).  See also Reno v. Bossier 
Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 363 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(describing the Section 5 test, as articulated in the statute, as “unconditional” and 
“uncompromising”). 
 45. 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). 
 46. See also City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 134 n.10 (1983) (interpreting the 
Beer Court’s holding). 
 47. That test had been set forth by the Court in the case of White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 
766 (1973). 
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voters to elect candidates of their choice.48  In 2003, however, in 
Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Court held that the retrogression analysis 
also must consider the impact of the change on the opportunity of 
minority voters to influence (but not decide) elections, and the 
impact on minority voters’ elected representatives’ ability to exert 
legislative leadership, influence, and power.49 
Pursuant to a 1975 Supreme Court decision, City of Richmond v. 
United States, a special effect test is used for reviewing annexations. 50  
Under that test, an annexation that meaningfully reduces a city’s 
minority population percentage in the context of racially polarized 
voting may be precleared only if the city’s election system “fairly 
reflects” minority voting strength in the enlarged city.51 
Notwithstanding the Court’s decision in Beer, and during almost 
the entire history of Section 5, the statute’s purpose standard broadly 
prohibited the implementation of changes that had any 
discriminatory intent, regardless of whether the intended harm was 
retrogression or vote dilution.  As noted, in 2000 the Court severely 
restricted the scope of the purpose standard in its decision in Reno v. 
Bossier Parish School Board (“Bossier Parish II”), holding that 
discriminatory purpose under Section 5 means only the intent to 
cause retrogression. 52  This effectively read the purpose standard out 
of the statute since the standard now adds little or nothing to the 
 
 48. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 983 (1996); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29–31 
(D.D.C. 2002), vacated and remanded, 539 U.S. 461, 491 (2003); Guidance Concerning 
Redistricting and Retrogression Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c 
(2000), 66 Fed. Reg. 5412, 5413 (Jan. 18, 2001). 
 49. 539 U.S. at 483–85. 
 50. 422 U.S. 358 (1975). 
 51. Id. at 371. 
 52. 528 U.S. 320, 329–32 (2000). 
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prohibition on the adoption of retrogressive voting changes 
contained in the Section 5 effect standard.53 
Beginning in the 1980s, the Justice Department also interposed 
objections where a change violated the requirements of another 
provision of the Voting Rights Act.  This included “clear” violations 
of the “results” test of Section 2 of the Act;54 violations of Sections 
4(f)(4)55 and 203,56 which require certain jurisdictions to provide 
 
 53. After Bossier Parish II, the purpose test is meaningful in Section 5 reviews only if and 
when a voting change is adopted by an incompetent retrogresser, i.e., a jurisdiction that intends to 
engage in retrogression but adopts a change that is not retrogressive in fact.  This circumstance is 
highly unlikely to occur and, indeed, the Justice Department has yet to find an incompetent 
retrogresser in the over six years since Bossier Parish II was decided. 
Bossier Parish II clarified two prior decisions of the Supreme Court holding that 
discriminatory purpose under Section 5 is co-extensive with the constitutional purpose standard.  
Id. at 331 (noting that City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975), “does not stand for 
the proposition that the purpose and effect prongs have fundamentally different meanings—the 
latter requiring retrogression, and the former not”); Id. at 340–41 (noting that the holding in City 
of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987), “had nothing to do with the question 
whether, to justify the denial of preclearance on the basis of the purpose prong, the purpose must 
be retrogressive” but rather “whether the purpose must be to achieve retrogression at once or 
could include, in the case of a jurisdiction with no present minority voters, retrogression with 
regard to operation of the proposed plan . . . against new minority voters in the future”).  Prior to 
Bossier Parish II, the Court took a first step toward ruling that non-retrogressive changes may not 
violate the Section 5 purpose standard in its decision in Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 923–24 
(1995), suggesting that the fact that a change is ameliorative should weigh heavily in favor of the 
conclusion that the change lacks a discriminatory purpose. 
 54. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 Fed. 
Reg. 490 (Jan. 6, 1987) codifying 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b) (1986), repealed by 63 Fed. Reg. 24,109 (May 
1, 1998).  The results test of Section 2 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000), renders unlawful any 
voting provision that denies minority voters an equal opportunity “to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice.”  See generally Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 
997 (1994); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993); 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).  A results claim does not require proof of 
discriminatory purpose.  When the Section 2 challenge is directed at an at-large election system, a 
system of multi-member districts, or a redistricting plan, the key issues are whether the minority 
group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in one or more 
single-member districts, whether the minority group votes in a cohesive manner, and whether 
white voters cast their ballots sufficiently as a bloc to enable them to usually defeat the minority’s 
preferred candidate.  These factors are not necessarily determinative and a variety of other factors 
may be considered, as well as the overall impact of the challenged provision with regard to the 
extent to which it provides an opportunity for minority voters to achieve proportional 
representation.  Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1006–08, 1011–12. 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(4)(f)(4) (2000). 
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election materials in languages other than English; and violations of 
Section 208, 57 which provides that voters may obtain assistance at the 
polls from any person of their choice, other than their employer or 
union representative.  However, in 1997, in its initial decision in the 
Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board litigation (“Bossier Parish I”), the 
Court held that preclearance may not be denied based on a Section 2 
results violation, thereby also precluding objections based on 
violations of other provisions of the Act. 58 
B. The Section 5 Administrative Framework 
The specific features of the administrative preclearance 
mechanism almost entirely have been developed by the Attorney 
General.  As described above, Congress made two critical decisions 
about the administrative preclearance process when it enacted 
Section 5—preclearance decisions are to be made by the Attorney 
General and preclearance decisions are to be made relatively 
quickly.59  Beyond that, however, Congress has provided no further 
direction, either in the statute or in legislative history.60 
In the absence of congressional direction, the Attorney General 
has developed a comprehensive set of procedures for making Section 
5 decisions.  These are set forth in the Attorney General’s Procedures 
for the Administration of Section 5,61 which initially were 
 
 56. Id. § 1973aa-1a. 
 57. Id. § 1973aa-6. 
 58. 520 U.S. 471, 480 (1997). 
 59. See supra p. 8–9 and notes 26–37. 
 60. See Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 504 n.18 (1977) (pointing out the absence of 
legislative history regarding the adoption of the administrative preclearance option); Georgia v. 
United States, 411 U.S. 526, 536 (1973) (discussing the fact that Section 5 does not specify the 
preclearance procedures to be used by the Justice Department). 
 61. 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 (2004). 
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promulgated in 197162 and have remained essentially the same since 
then.63  They are also reflected in certain informal practices that have 
been followed, beginning at about the time that the written 
procedures first were put forward.64  Several of the most important 
features of the written procedures, discussed below, were easily 
foreseen at the time Section 5 was enacted and thus, it may be 
argued, were fully anticipated by Congress in 1965.  Moreover, 
following the promulgation of the Section 5 Procedures in 1971 and 
the adoption of the other, informal processes, Congress has twice 
renewed Section 5 (in 1975 and 1982) with full knowledge of the 
administrative structure and processes established by the Attorney 
General.65  Accordingly, it may be fairly concluded that the 
administrative framework crafted by the Attorney General fully 
accords with congressional intent.66 
Perhaps the most important of the provisions included in the 
Section 5 procedures is the delegation of authority to make Section 5 
preclearance decisions from the Attorney General to the Assistant 
 
 62. 36 Fed. Reg. 18,186 (Sept. 10, 1971). 
 63. Compare the initial regulations supra note 62, with the current regulations supra note 61.  
The principal change was the addition in 1987 of a section describing the substantive standards 
used by the Justice Department in making its preclearance decisions.  52 Fed. Reg. 486 (Jan. 6, 
1987). 
 64. These informal procedures are well known to the author based on his work supervising 
Section 5 reviews within the Justice Department. 
 65. Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 1717, 1729–39 (1982) (exhibits to the testimony of Assistant Attorney 
General William Bradford Reynolds); Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 601–09 (1975) 
(exhibits to the testimony of Assistant Attorney General J. Stanley Pottinger). 
 66. See United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Sheffield, 435 U.S. 110, 132 (1978) (congressional 
inaction evidence of congressional intent); Georgia v. United States, 441 U.S. 526, 533 (1973) 
(same).  The Supreme Court also has stated that the Justice Department’s administrative 
interpretation of the Act typically provides persuasive evidence of congressional intent in light of 
the Attorney General’s primary role in initially formulating the statute.  Lopez v. Monterey 
County, 525 U.S. 266, 281 (1999); Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 39 
(1978); Bd. of Comm’rs of Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 131. 
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Attorney General for Civil Rights.67  It is hardly surprising that the 
Attorney General did not retain this authority given the scope of the 
Section 5 decisional workload (initially, hundreds of preclearance 
decisions each year and, by the early 1970s, thousands of decisions 
each year).68  It also was clearly foreseeable that the Civil Rights 
Division, rather than some other existing entity in the Department or 
some new, specially created unit, would be selected to receive the 
delegation of authority.  The Division was the entity in the 
Department that had been responsible for prosecuting voting rights 
litigation prior to the 1965 Act,69 and thus had the necessary 
knowledge, expertise, and interest to enforce the administrative 
preclearance requirement. 
The Section 5 procedures further delegate a large portion of the 
decisional authority from the Assistant Attorney General to the Chief 
of the Division’s Voting Section, a career government employee.70  
The Section Chief generally is empowered to make all Section 5 
decisions except objections and decisions whether to withdraw an 
objection.71  The delegation of authority to the Voting Section Chief 
reflects the informal rule that all factual investigations of 
administrative preclearance requests are conducted by the Section’s 
career lawyers and legal analysts, who then prepare the requisite 
factual and legal analyses.  Again, given the very large number of 
 
 67. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 
C.F.R. § 51.3 (2005). 
 68. See discussion infra Part II. 
 69. GARROW, supra note 25, at 12–18. 
 70. 28 C.F.R. § 51.3 (2004). 
 71. Id.  Accordingly, the Section Chief typically may decide to preclear any and all the 
changes submitted for review, and may decide whether instead to make a written request to the 
submitting jurisdiction for additional information on the changes (essentially, a limited set of 
interrogatories that allows the sixty-day review period to begin anew when the jurisdiction fully 
responds to the request).  Id.  § 51.37. 
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administrative preclearance decisions that must be made each year, it 
is hardly surprising that the overwhelming majority of the decisions 
are made by a senior career attorney in the Division and that the 
Division’s career staff plays a central role in shaping the 
Department’s understanding of whether the submitted change is 
discriminatory or not. 
The Section 5 procedures establish a highly structured but 
relatively informal set of procedures for conducting administrative 
preclearance reviews.  Jurisdictions initiate a review by sending a 
letter to the Voting Section that identifies the voting changes at issue 
and provides certain background data and documentation.72  The 
Justice Department then conducts a factual investigation and either 
preclears, objects, or states that a substantive determination is 
inappropriate (e.g., because the submitted voting provision does not 
constitute a change from prior practice or has not been finally 
enacted by the jurisdiction).73 
The administrative review procedure is fundamentally different 
from the procedures that apply when preclearance is sought from the 
district court.  Though the Justice Department uses the same legal 
standard and the same burden of proof as the court,74 the 
administrative procedure includes no hearing where witnesses may 
be examined and cross-examined, no depositions, no authority to 
subpoena documents, and no formal rules of evidence regarding the 
information that may be considered by the Department.75  These 
differences are the direct and inevitable result of the extreme time 
pressure created by the statutory sixty-day review requirement and 
 
 72. Id. §§ 51.27–.28. 
 73. Id. §§ 51.35, 51.41, 51.44, 51.52. 
 74. Id. § 51.52(a). 
 75. Id. 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, subpt. E. 
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the tremendous number of submissions that must be resolved on a 
daily basis by the Department. 
This time pressure also is probably largely responsible for the 
summary nature of the Justice Department’s objection letters.  There 
simply is no time for the preparation of detailed justification 
statements.76  Likewise, there is no time to explain the reasons for 
Department decisions to preclear submitted changes.77 
III 
OVERVIEW OF THE JUSTICE  
DEPARTMENT’S PRECLEARANCE DECISIONS 
The first step in assessing the appropriateness of the Justice 
Department’s preclearance decisionmaking is to obtain an overall 
picture of the Department’s preclearance decisions. Relevant 
questions include: How often has the Attorney General denied 
preclearance?  How does the number of objections compare to the 
total number of submitted changes?  What types of changes most 
frequently have been found to be discriminatory?  To what extent 
have the objections been based on retrogression, non-retrogressive 
discriminatory purpose, or violations of other provisions of the 
Voting Rights Act?  Have there been any changes in the patterns of 
Section 5 activity over time?  And, lastly, how many preclearance 
decisions have been made by the District of Columbia Court as 
 
 76. In addition, the time pressure and the limited tools available to the Justice Department to 
obtain information necessarily render the Department’s analyses and conclusions somewhat 
provisional in nature, which in turn could make the Department reluctant to set forth detailed 
findings in the objection letters. 
 77. See id. § 51.42 (suggesting that preclearance determinations need not be accompanied by 
any explanation since it specifies that the Department may preclear changes simply by not 
responding within the sixty-day review period). 
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compared with the Attorney General, and to what extent has the 
district court denied preclearance? 78 
A. Summary of Section 5 Actions Since 1965 
Since the enactment of Section 5 in 1965, the Justice Department 
has interposed objections to approximately 3,126 individual voting 
changes contained in approximately 1,102 submissions.  The great 
 
 78. The statistics cited in this article are current through 2005.  Except as otherwise noted, all 
statistics were obtained from the computer database maintained by the Department of Justice.  All 
Justice Department data reports relied upon are on file with the author.  These include:  “Number 
of Objections by Type of Change”; “Number of Submissions to Which Objections Have Been 
Interposed”; “Number of Changes by Type of Change”; and “Number of Submissions by State.”  
A version of the “Number of Changes by Type of Change” report is located on the Justice 
Department’s website (http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/changes.htm); the Department has 
not placed the other three types of reports on its website, but they are available by request from 
the Department.  The author has had extensive experience in utilizing the Justice Department’s 
preclearance statistics and also was responsible for designing and supervising the implementation 
of the Department’s current data system. 
The Justice Department counts its Section 5 actions in two ways, by voting changes and by 
submissions.  Voting changes are the discrete, individual modifications in voting practices and 
procedures that covered jurisdictions enact or seek to administer, and are the legal units of 
activity subject to Section 5 review.  (For example, each discrete polling place that is moved 
constitutes a voting change as does each modification in state election law, and each redistricting 
plan is a single change.)  When covered jurisdictions submit a preclearance request to the Justice 
Department, they frequently include several related voting changes in one request (e.g., several 
polling place changes, several municipal annexations, or a redistricting and a realignment of 
voting precincts), and the Department counts each set of changes submitted on the same date by a 
particular jurisdiction as a single “submission.” 
The Justice Department’s statistics are reasonably accurate, and provide a reliable portrait of 
the levels and trends of administrative preclearance activity.  For a variety of reasons, the statistics 
are not absolutely precise, but the statistical problems are relatively slight.  The data for 
preclearance activity beginning in 1990 (when the Department began use of a modern relational 
database) are the most accurate, and include additional levels of detail that provide a greater 
opportunity to drill down into the data for analysis purposes. 
The preclearance statistics cited in this Article as representing the Section 5 data set also 
include the very small number of voting changes submitted for preclearance pursuant to a 
different provision of the Voting Rights Act, Section 3(c).  42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2000).  Section 
3(c) grants district courts the authority to require a jurisdiction not covered by Section 5 to obtain 
preclearance of its voting changes, for a specified period of time, as part of the relief granted to 
plaintiffs in a voting discrimination lawsuit.  Based on this author’s review of Justice Department 
preclearance statistics, it appears that Section 3(c) changes make up less than one percent of the 
total number of changes submitted pursuant to both requirements, and only one objection has 
been interposed to a Section 3(c) submission. 
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majority of the objections (81 percent) deal with changes to the 
constituencies used to elect public officials and the rules for 
determining election outcomes, i.e., annexations (1,261 or 40 
percent), method of election changes (771 or 25 percent), and 
redistrictings (509 or 16 percent).  In other words, the great majority 
of the objections deal with the issue of minority vote dilution.79 
These objections have had an enormous impact on the electoral 
practices of the covered jurisdictions and, in turn, on the electoral 
opportunity of minority citizens.  The objections have directly 
altered the election practices of numerous jurisdictions.80  In 
addition, the deterrence that has flowed from the objections has 
exerted a substantial influence on covered jurisdictions, prompting 
them to both refrain from adopting voting changes harmful to 
minority voters and to adopt beneficial changes.81 
B. Patterns of Section 5 Activity by Time Period 
As set forth in Tables 1 and 2 below, there have been significant 
changes over time with regard to the number of submissions received 
by the Department of Justice, the number of objections interposed by 
the Department, and the legal bases relied upon by the Department 
in interposing objections. 
 
 79. The Justice Department objection statistics include a small percentage of objections that 
were interposed and then later withdrawn by the Department.  Complete Listing of Section 5 
Objections, supra note 15.  The Department’s withdrawal letters reflect that objections may be 
withdrawn either because the jurisdiction has acted to remedy the discriminatory features of the 
change or because the Department concludes that it erred in its initial determination.  The small 
number involved in the latter group does not meaningfully skew the objection numbers reported 
in this Article. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: “When It 
Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn’t Everything, It’s the Only Thing”?, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1237, 
1263–65 (1993); Posner, supra note 15, at 94–96. 
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Table 1 summarizes the number of submissions and objections by 
summing them generally into five-year time periods: 82 
Table 1: Submissions and Objections by Time Period 
Subject 1965
–70 
1971
–75 
1976–
80 
1981–
85 
1986–
90 
1991–
95 
1996–
00 
2001–
05 
Total 
Submitted          
Submissions — — — — — 22, 
980 
21, 
447 
24, 
894 
— 
Changes 
(all) 
578 5,976 28, 
244 
64, 
742 
86,575 92, 
243 
79, 
472 
81, 
422 
439, 
252 
Annex’s 11 1,585 5,653 10, 
016 
19,356 14, 
157 
17, 
900 
20, 
253 
88, 
931 
Redist’ings 43 612 600 1,734 1,180 2,940 402 2,888 10, 
240 
MOE83 — — — 1,756 3,597 4,829 2,513 2,604 15, 
49584 
 
Objections          
Submissions 22 185 197 186 138 302 32 40 1,102 
Changes 
(all) 
25 386 400 496 1, 
13785 
579 55 48 3,126 
 
 82. The Justice Department did not begin to track the number of new Section 5 submissions 
until 1990.  Accordingly, the chart includes submission numbers only beginning with the 1991–
1995 half-decade period (the Department does report submission data for 1980 through 1989, but 
these data were constructed after-the-fact and are only very roughly accurate).  The Department 
did not begin to track the number of submitted election method changes until 1980, and therefore 
these numbers are included in the chart beginning with the 1981–1985 period. 
 83. This row concerns method of election changes (e.g., from at large to districts or vice-
versa, and the adoption of majority-vote requirements, numbered posts, residency districts, and 
staggered terms). 
 84. As indicated in the chart, the total for the number of submitted election method changes 
does not include the number submitted from 1965 through 1980.  Based on this author’s review of 
available Section 5 data, a reasonable guesstimate for the actual grand total for submitted election 
method changes is about 17,000. 
 85. The objection statistics for the 1986–1990 period include an objection in 1986 to 525 
annexations by a single city, included in one submission. 
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Annex’s 0 95 148 219 663 125 9 2 1,261 
Redist’ings 1 65 37 121 55 190 10 30 509 
MOE 5 175 154 69 169 175 11 13 771 
 
As indicated in the table, covered jurisdictions made very few 
submissions  during the first five years after Section 5 was enacted 
(i.e., the entire time period that the statute initially was to remain in 
effect).  After the Supreme Court’s decision in Allen v. State Board of 
Elections,86 holding that Section 5 broadly applies to all changes 
affecting voting, and the publication of the Attorney General’s 
Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 in 1971,87 the number 
of submitted changes increased substantially.  The number leaped 
upward again when Texas became covered pursuant to the 1975 
Voting Rights Act amendments.88  The increases continued into and 
through the 1980s, and through the first half of the 1990s.  In the 
second half of the 1990s and in this decade, the number of submitted 
changes has declined to some extent. 
Initially, from 1965 to 1970, the Justice Department issued few 
objections, since few submissions were being made.  With the 
increase in the number of submissions beginning in 1971, the 
number of submissions and changes to which objections were 
interposed also increased substantially, and the number of 
submission objections then remained fairly constant until 1985.  
Throughout this period, there were a large number of annexation 
objections.  Redistricting objections were particularly prevalent from 
 
 86. 393 U.S. 544, 563–71 (1969). 
 87. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 36 Fed. Reg. 
18,186 (Sept. 10, 1971) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 51). 
 88. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 
C.F.R. pt. 51 app. (2005). 
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1981 to 1985, when a much larger number of redistricting plans were 
submitted than in previous years.  Election method objections were 
especially prevalent in the 1970s, when the Department interposed a 
large number of objections to the adoption of at-large election 
systems and to provisions that enhanced the discriminatory effect of 
at-large election systems (majority-vote requirements and provisions 
that eliminated or limited the opportunity to single-shot vote).  
These objections continued into the 1980s, but at a lower rate.89 
During the latter half of the 1980s (through 1990), the overall 
number of submission objections declined (though the number of 
objected-to changes increased), as the post-1980 redistricting cycle 
ran its course.  However, the Department continued to object to 
numerous annexations.  In addition, the number of election method 
objections notably increased, reflecting the Department’s continuing 
objections to practices that enhanced the discriminatory effect of at-
large elections and the Department’s new objections to changes from 
at-large to mixed (district and at-large) election systems.90 
Following the 1990 Census, redistrictings flooded into the 
Department for review and, as was the case after the 1980 Census, the 
Department interposed objections to a significant number of plans.  
With the increase in the number of redistricting objections and a 
continuing high number of election method objections, the overall 
number of submission objections reached a record high from 1991 
through 1995. 
Beginning in about 1996, however, the number of submission 
objections took an abrupt nose dive, and has remained at a very low 
level since then.  The steep reduction has occurred across the 
 
 89. Complete Listing of Section 5 Objections, supra note 15. 
 90. Id. 
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board—there have been only a handful of annexation objections, 
relatively few election method objections, and, unlike what occurred 
after the 1980 and 1990 Censuses, there was only a small uptick in 
the number of redistricting objections after the 2000 Census. 
Table 2 summarizes the extent to which various legal bases have 
been used by the Justice Department to support its objections.91  The 
objection-basis categories are: “retrogression” (objections based 
solely on retrogression or on a combination of retrogression and 
other bases); “purpose” (objections to non-retrogressive changes 
based solely on purpose or on purpose and another basis other than 
retrogression); “dilutive effect, Section 2, and minority language” 
(objections based solely on the constitutional vote dilution law that 
preceded the incorporation of that law into the Section 2 results test 
in 1982, the Section 2 results test, or the provisions of the Voting 
Rights Act that require the translation of election materials into 
languages other than English); and “other.” 
 
 91. The Justice Department does not maintain any summary data regarding the legal bases it 
has relied upon in its objections.  The pre-2000 data included in Table 2 are from McCrary, 
Seaman, & Valelly, supra note 14, at 82, who constructed their data set by reviewing all of the 
Department’s pre-2000 objection letters.  Id. at 28–35 (describing the research design).  The post-
2000 data were developed by this author, using the same approach as McCrary, Seaman, & 
Valelly. 
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Table 2: Objection Bases by Time Period 
Objection Basis 1965–79 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Retrogression92 83% 66% 40% 98% 
Purpose 3% 27% 55% 2% 
Dilutive Effect, Section 2, & 
Minority Language 10% 2% 3% 0% 
Other 4% 6% 1% 0% 
 
As can be seen from Table 2, during the first fifteen years of 
Section 5 enforcement, objections typically were interposed because 
the submitted voting changes were retrogressive (over four-fifths of 
the objections were based on retrogression).  In the 1980s, 
retrogression became less important (accounting for about two-
thirds of the objections) and the Department increasingly interposed 
objections to non-retrogressive changes based on discriminatory 
purpose (discriminatory purpose accounted for a mere three percent 
of the objections prior to 1980 but was the basis for about a fourth of 
the 1980s objections).  This trend continued with full force into the 
1990s, with purpose objections overtaking retrogression objections as 
the most common type of objection (purpose objections constituted 
just over half the 1990s objections).  However, in January 2000, the 
Supreme Court released its decision in Bossier Parish II, effectively 
eliminating the purpose test from Section 5.93  Few objections have 
been interposed since then, and all except one have been based on 
 
 92. A small percentage (about nine percent) of the retrogression objections interposed in the 
1980s were based on the analysis developed by the District Court for the District of Columbia in 
Wilkes County v. United States.  450 F. Supp. 1171, 1174–76 (D.D.C.), aff’d mem., 439 U.S. 999, 
999 (1978).  As discussed infra at Part IV.A.4, although the Wilkes County test purportedly was a 
retrogression test, it did not measure whether minority voters in fact would be worse off than 
before if the enacted voting change was implemented, and thus it actually did not provide a basis 
for interposing retrogression objections. 
 93. See discussion supra at Part I.A. and note 58. 
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retrogression.94  The Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in Bossier Parish 
I—precluding objections based on Section 2 or other provisions of 
the Voting Rights Act—had less impact since, as indicated in Table 2, 
only a small percentage of objections prior to that decision were 
based solely on the Section 2 results test or on the Act’s minority 
language requirements. 
C. Objections to Redistrictings, Election Method Changes, and 
Annexations 
1. Redistricting objections 
More detailed information regarding the Justice Department’s 
redistricting objections is set forth in Table 3.95 
 
 94. The one purpose objection interposed after the Bossier Parish II decision (to a non-
retrogressive change) apparently was not based on the “intent to retrogress” standard but, instead, 
appears to have been based on the pre-Bossier definition of discriminatory purpose.  Letter from 
R. Alexander Acosta, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., to the 
Honorable H. Bruce Buckheister, Mayor (Sept. 16, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/ 
ltr/l_091603.html.  Thus, as discussed above, the Justice Department has yet to identify an 
instance in which, after Bossier Parish II, a covered jurisdiction acted as an “incompetent 
retrogressor” in enacting or seeking to administer a voting change. 
 95. The data in Table 3 concern both redistrictings and the adoption of first-time districting 
plans in connection with a change from an at-large to a district method of election.  The data on 
the number of submitted plans, objected-to plans, and states with objected-to statewide plans in 
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s are from this author’s previous essay analyzing the Justice 
Department’s preclearance reviews of redistricting plans.  Posner, supra note 15, at 88–89.  The 
parallel data for this decade were obtained from the Justice Department’s preclearance data 
reports.  The data on the bases for the objections in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s were developed 
by this author using the same approach followed by McCrary, Seaman & Valelly, supra note 14, at 
28–35 (describing research design).  As is the case in Table 2, the “retrogression” category 
includes objections based in whole or in part on retrogression, and the “purpose” category 
includes objections to non-retrogressive changes based in whole or in part on discriminatory 
purpose. 
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Table 3: Redistricting Objections Following the Decennial Censuses 
Subject 
1970s 
(1971–74) 
1980s 
(April 1981 
to June 30, 
1985) 
1990s 
(April 1991 
to June 30, 
1995) 
2000s 
(2001 to 
June 30, 
2005) 
Submitted c. 400 c. 1500 c. 2800 c. 2800 
Objections 
(% of 
submitted) 
58 (15%) c. 113 (8%) c. 185 (7%) 31 (1%) 
Retrogression 
Objections96 
(% of 
objections) 
Not tallied 56 (50%) 31 (17%) 30 (100%) 
Purpose 
Objections 
(% of 
objections) 
Not tallied 38 (34%) 153 (83%) 0 
States in 
Which AG 
Interposed an 
Objection to 
One or More 
Statewide 
Plans 
6 10 13 3 
 
 
 96. About 13 of the retrogression objections interposed in the 1980s were based exclusively 
on Wilkes County, 450 F. Supp. at 1174–76. 
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As can be seen, the number of redistricting submissions increased 
dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s, and then leveled off after 2000.97  
The number of objections likewise rose substantially in the 1980s and 
1990s, and these objections were increasingly based on 
discriminatory purpose and not retrogression.  Following the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bossier Parish II, the number of 
redistricting objections decreased dramatically. 
2. Election method objections 
The Justice Department’s election method objections may be 
categorized into four groups by the type of election method change 
and the usual basis for the objection.98 
The first two groups have consisted of changes from district to at-
large elections, and changes within the context of a pre-existing at-
large system that enhanced the at-large system’s discriminatory 
impact (i.e., majority-vote requirements and provisions such as 
numbered posts, residency districts, and staggered terms that 
preclude or limit the ability to engage in single-shot voting).  These 
objections typically have been based in whole or in part on 
retrogression, and have been a staple of Section 5 enforcement since 
Section 5’s enactment.99 
 
 97. The 1980s increase was due in large part to increased compliance by local jurisdictions 
with the one-person, one-vote requirement and the addition of Texas as a covered state in 1975.  
Posner, supra note 15, at 81.  The 1990s increase was due in large part to jurisdictions changing 
from at large to district systems following Congress’s adoption of the Section 2 results test in 
1982.  Id.; NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, PROTECTING MINORITY VOTERS 
81–88 (2006); QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, supra note 6, at 385. 
 98. The information regarding the bases for the election method objections and the issues 
that these objections addressed comes from this author’s extensive knowledge of these objections 
from his years of work supervising Section 5 reviews within the Justice Department. 
 99. Since 1965, the Justice Department has interposed approximately ninety objections to at-
large election systems, 100 objections to the adoption of a majority-vote requirement in the 
context of a pre-existing at-large system, and 130 objections to the adoption of anti-single-shot 
provisions in the context of a pre-existing at-large system.  Complete Listing of Section 5 
Objections, supra note 15. 
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The third group has involved changes from at-large voting to 
mixed systems of district and at-large seats.  These changes were not 
retrogressive and the objections generally were based on 
discriminatory purpose.  The objections were triggered by a 
jurisdiction retaining a relatively large proportion of at-large seats in 
the new election system or limiting minority electoral opportunity 
with regard to the at-large seats (by adopting a majority vote 
requirement, numbered posts, and/or staggered terms).  These 
objections became prominent in the early to mid-1980s when, as 
previously noted, many local jurisdictions abandoned their at-large 
systems in response to the 1982 enactment of the Section 2 results 
test.100  These objections disappeared in the mid-1990s, first because 
fewer jurisdictions changed from at-large voting (probably in large 
part because so many had made the change in the prior ten years or 
so), and then because the Supreme Court (in its Bossier Parish II 
decision) eliminated non-retrogressive, discriminatory purpose as a 
basis for interposing Section 5 objections.101 
The last group has involved changes in the number of elected 
officials or the creation of new elected bodies where the objection 
was prompted by a determination that the method of election to be 
utilized for the new elected officials was discriminatory.  These 
objections also generally were not based on retrogression.  A large 
percentage were to the establishment of new elected state court 
judgeships;102 the objections to additional judgeships began in 1988 
 
 100. Since 1982, the Justice Department has interposed objections to about fifty submissions 
where the change was from at-large voting to a mixed system.  Id. 
 101. Data on the number of jurisdictions submitting specific types of election methods for 
preclearance are available in the Justice Department’s database only for years beginning in 1991.  
From 1991 through 1995, jurisdictions submitted an average of forty-four mixed election systems 
for preclearance each year.  Since 1995, the per-year average has been about twelve. 
 102. Complete Listing of Section 5 Objections, supra note 15. 
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and ended in the mid-1990s after four states responded to these 
objections by seeking preclearance from the District Court for the 
District of Columbia and obtaining judgments in their favor.103 
3. Annexation objections 
Typically, annexation objections have been interposed based on 
the Supreme Court’s 1975 decision in City of Richmond v. United 
States, which held that annexations that significantly reduce a city’s 
minority population percentage in the context of racially polarized 
voting may be precleared only if the city’s election system fairly 
reflects minority voting strength in the post-annexation city. 104  
Annexation objections also have been based on racial selectivity, i.e., 
a determination that the new lines were selected based on the race of 
the persons to be included or not included in the annexed area.105 
D. Preclearance Decisions by the District of Columbia Court 
Covered jurisdictions rarely seek preclearance by filing suit in the 
District Court for the District of Columbia.  Whereas jurisdictions 
have sought preclearance from the Justice Department for over 
439,000 voting changes since 1965, they have filed only sixty-eight 
preclearance lawsuits, involving perhaps several hundred changes. 106  
 
 103. Texas v. United States, No. 94-1529, 1995 WL 769160, at *1 (D.D.C. July 10, 1995); Texas 
v. United States, No. 94-1529, 1995 WL 456338, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 1995); Georgia v. Reno, 
881 F. Supp. 7, 8 (D.D.C. 1995); New York v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 394, 395 (D.D.C. 1994), 
reconsideration denied, 880 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1995).  See also Arizona v. Reno, 887 F. Supp. 
318, 321, 324 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that preclearance may not be denied based on a Section 2 
violation; the case was continued as to the purpose issue, and the Justice Department 
subsequently agreed that no discriminatory purpose was present and that preclearance was 
required). 
 104. 422 U.S. 358, 378 (1975).  The information regarding the frequency with which 
annexation objections have been based on the City of Richmond rationale comes from this 
author’s extensive experience in enforcing Section 5 within the Justice Department. 
 105. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 388 (1971). 
 106. Department of Justice, Section 5 Declaratory Judgment Actions (Aug. 2004 table) (on file 
with author). 
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Only nineteen have produced preclearance decisions in contested 
cases (eight in favor of preclearance, eleven not), and several resulted 
in court rulings without an ultimate preclearance determination; the 
others led to judicial preclearance with no Justice Department 
opposition or were dismissed.107 
The paucity of preclearance court filings and decisions not only 
means that the Justice Department makes almost all the preclearance 
decisions, it also means that the Department carries out its 
responsibility with little year-to-year supervision by the courts.  For 
example, since 1982 (the year that Section 5 last was extended), there 
have been a total of only four court decisions regarding the 
application of Section 5 to redistrictings (by the district court in 1982 
in Busbee v. Smith,108 and by the Supreme Court in 1997, 2000, and 
2003 in the Bossier Parish School Board cases and in Georgia v. 
Ashcroft),109 despite the fact that the review of redistricting plans is 
one of the most important and controversial applications of the 
preclearance requirement. 
IV 
PRIOR VIEWS REGARDING THE JUSTICE  
DEPARTMENT’S MODUS OPERANDI IN ENFORCING SECTION 5 
A. Justice Department as Illegitimate Advocate for Minority 
Voters 
1. View from the Supreme Court 
The best-known and authoritative critique of the Justice 
Department’s modus operandi in enforcing Section 5 has come from 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. 549 F. Supp. 494, 526 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem., 459 U.S. 1166, 1166 (1983). 
 109. 539 U.S. 461 (2003). 
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the Supreme Court, in its 1995 decision in Miller v. Johnson,110 the 
Court’s first application of the race-conscious redistricting limitation 
announced in Shaw v. Reno.111  Miller involved a challenge to the 
congressional redistricting plan adopted by the State of Georgia 
following the 1990 Census.  Georgia defended the plan by arguing 
that it had been adopted to remedy the Justice Department’s 
objections to the State’s two earlier attempts to redraw the State’s 
congressional district lines after the 1990 Census; these objections, 
the State argued, provided it with the compelling state interest 
needed if the challenged plan was to be subjected to a strict scrutiny 
review.  The Court disagreed, holding that Justice Department 
objections, on their face, may not supply the requisite compelling 
state interest, and that the specific objections interposed to the 
Georgia plans were flawed and thus did not provide the requisite 
compelling state interest in that case.112 
According to Miller, the Georgia objections were of no avail 
because they were based on a purported Justice Department policy of 
refusing to grant preclearance to submitted redistricting plans unless 
the plans included the maximum number of majority-minority 
districts that could be drawn.113  To reach this conclusion, the 
Supreme Court began by affirming the district court’s ruling that the 
congressional redistricting plans to which the Department had 
objected did not, in fact, violate the Section 5 nondiscrimination test.  
The Justice Department had based its objections on discriminatory 
purpose (the plans were not retrogressive) but the Court concluded 
 
 110. 515 U.S. 900, 920–27 (1995). 
 111. 509 U.S. 630, 647–49 (1993). 
 112. Miller, 515 U.S. at 922–25.  The Court assumed, but did not decide, that the existence of a 
valid Section 5 objection may qualify as a compelling state interest.  Id. at 921. 
 113. Id. at 924–25. 
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that the purpose claim was “insupportable.”114  This finding, by itself, 
meant that the Department’s objections to the earlier Georgia plans 
were invalid, and thus it was sufficient to defeat the State’s argument 
that remedying the objections provided the State with the requisite 
compelling state interest.  Nonetheless, the Court went on, affirming 
the district court’s further ruling that the objections were based on a 
Justice Department maximization policy.115  According to the Court, 
this policy not only misapplied the Section 5 nondiscrimination test 
but, more fundamentally, raised “serious constitutional concerns”116 
because of its “implicit command that States engage in presumptively 
unconstitutional race-based districting.”117  In other words, according 
to the Court, the Justice Department was not merely mistaken when 
it interposed the objections, it had acted in an illegitimate manner. 
The evidentiary support for the Court’s “Justice Department as 
illegitimate maximizer” conclusion was extraordinarily weak, 
however.  At the outset, the Court made no claim that the Justice 
Department had set forth its purported policy in any written 
document (in Section 5 objection letters or otherwise).  No 
documentation was produced in support of the existence of any such 
policy and, as the Court acknowledged, the Solicitor General had 
advised the Court that no such policy existed.118 
 
 114. Id. at 924. 
 115. Id. at 925–26. 
 116. Id. at 926. 
 117. Id. at 927. 
 118. Id. at 924–25.  Similarly, in speeches that dealt with the Justice Department’s approach to 
reviewing post-1990 redistrictings, Department officials stated that the Department was not 
enforcing any policy of maximization or proportionality.  See e.g., John R. Dunne, Remarks, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1127, 1128 (1993) (“There is one thing the Civil Rights Division does not do:  It 
does not require, because the law does not require, the maximization of minority representation. . 
. .  Nor are jurisdictions required to guarantee or to attempt to guarantee racial or ethnic 
proportional results.”). 
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Lacking direct evidence, the Court nonetheless concluded that it 
could infer the existence of a maximization policy.  This was 
problematic on its face, since the Court had before it information 
about just two of the Department’s post-1990 redistricting 
objections, a poor foundation on which to infer a general policy.  
Moreover, even with regard to the two Georgia objections, the 
Court’s evidence consisted of a small assortment of less-than 
probative or unpersuasive facts. 
The most damning admission, according to the Court, was a 
statement by a Justice Department line attorney noting that, during 
the Section 5 reviews of the objected-to plans, one method he used to 
analyze the plans was to overlay the adopted district lines on a map 
showing the location of black population concentrations to “‘see how 
well those lines adequately reflected black voting strength.’”119  Yet, 
this action, on its face, was clearly appropriate since it provided 
relevant information about the impact of the plan on black voters, an 
assessment that is an essential part of any inquiry into discriminatory 
purpose.120  Whether, as the Supreme Court contended, this action 
had a more sinister motive could not be gleaned from the line 
attorney’s statement but only could be demonstrated by some other 
extraneous evidence.  But the other inferential evidence pointed to by 
the Court, in a string citation to the district court’s findings, is 
equally unpersuasive.121 
 
 119. Miller, 515 U.S. at 925. 
 120. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). 
 121. Miller, 515 U.S. at 925 n.*.  The only other direct statement by a Justice Department 
employee cited by the Court was a statement by the Assistant Attorney General regarding the 
Department’s approach to applying the Section 2 results test in Section 5 reviews.  But that test 
was not at issue in the Georgia objections, as the Court recognized. 
The Court cited to one secondhand report of a Justice Department statement regarding the 
Department’s approach to enforcing Section 5, offered by a black Georgia state legislator.  The 
legislator testified that the Justice Department had told covered jurisdictions that Section 5 
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Having found this policy with respect to the Justice Department’s 
review of Georgia’s congressional redistricting plans, the Supreme 
Court has not addressed the purported scope of the policy’s 
application.  Clearly, however, the Court does not view it as having 
been limited to the Georgia reviews122 and, if the policy existed, there 
does not seem to be any reason why it would have been limited to 
any particular subset of the Department’s reviews of post-1990 
redistricting plans (at least those reviews conducted prior to the 
Court’s rulings in Shaw and Miller). 
If the Justice Department actually imposed a constitutionally-
suspect maximization policy in reviewing the post-1990 redistrictings 
 
required them to draw as many black-majority districts as possible in adopting post-1990 plans.  
But this was a weak and solitary evidentiary reed, given that the legislator was a leading proponent 
of efforts to maximize the number of black-majority congressional districts in Georgia and thus 
was a self-interested reporter of what the Justice Department allegedly had said.  In addition, his 
was the only secondhand statement provided by the district court to the effect that Department 
officials had spoken of a maximization policy. 
The Supreme Court also noted two district court findings that merely built on the district 
court’s maximization conclusion but did nothing to demonstrate that the underlying finding itself 
was valid.  The district court found that, during the Section 5 reviews of the Georgia plans, the 
Justice Department did not retreat from applying its purported maximization policy, and that the 
Department’s adoption of such a policy suggested that the Department did not understand the 
importance of other districting considerations. 
Lastly, the Court noted the district court’s citation to similar findings by other district courts.  
Id. (citing Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1383 n.35 (S.D. Ga. 1994)).  However, the record 
in this regard is also slim and unpersuasive.  The district court cited to three cases:  Shaw v. Hunt, 
861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994), rev’d, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (where the dissenting district court 
judge argued the maximization point), 861 F. Supp. at 486–88; Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 
1188, 1196–1197 n.21 (W.D. La. 1993), vacated & remanded, 512 U.S. 1230 (1994) (demonstrating 
that the court’s maximization concern flowed entirely from its strong disagreement with the 
Justice Department’s application of the Voting Rights Act’s legal standards, and not from any 
affirmative evidence of a maximization policy); and, Turner v. Arkansas, 784 F. Supp. 553, 561 
(E.D. Ark. 1991), aff’d mem., 504 U.S. 952 (1992) (demonstrating that the court simply quoted 
with approval the opinion of conservative theorist Abigail Thernstrom that the Justice 
Department was wrongfully promoting race-conscious redistricting). 
 122. In Shaw v. Hunt, a post-Miller race-conscious redistricting case, the Supreme Court 
applied its maximization finding in Miller to hold that the Justice Department had used the same 
policy in interposing an objection to North Carolina’s post-1990 congressional redistricting plan.  
517 U.S. 899, 911–12 (1996).  The Court’s holding was based entirely on the Miller finding and 
did not cite any further evidence that a maximization policy existed.  Id. 
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enacted by Section 5 jurisdictions, one might think that, after the 
holdings in Shaw and Miller, these plans would have been struck 
down en masse.  This policy potentially would have infected, and 
thus rendered suspect, a very large number of post-1990 plans—most 
of the remedial plans adopted after the Department interposed 
objections, as well as many that the Department initially precleared, 
since jurisdictions allegedly were advised by the Department of the 
maximization policy123 and presumably would have had an interest in 
implementing the maximization approach on their own in order to 
avoid an objection.124  The policy also could have infected plans 
adopted after the 2000 Census as well, since jurisdictions whose post-
1990 plan had not been invalidated as a racial gerrymander could 
have been deterred from undoing maximization that occurred in the 
post-1990 plan because of concerns regarding the Section 5 
retrogression standard. 
That said, the record indicates that only a handful of redistricting 
plans adopted by Section 5 jurisdictions have been invalidated as 
unconstitutional racial gerrymanders.125  While there may be a 
 
 123. Miller, 515 U.S. at 925 n.*. 
 124. From April 1991 until June 1995, when Miller was decided, the Department interposed 
objections to plans for almost 150 elected bodies and reviewed over 2,800 redistricting plans.  
Posner, supra note 15, at 88–92; See supra Table 3. 
 125. Congressional plans have been struck down in six states wholly or partially covered by 
Section 5 (in the partially covered states, the invalidated district included covered counties):  
Georgia (Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994), aff’d & remanded, 515 U.S. 900 
(1995), on remand, 922 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Ga. 1995), aff’d on other grounds, 521 U.S. 74 (1997)); 
Louisiana (Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993), vacated & remanded, 512 U.S. 
1230 (1994), on remand, 862 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1994), vacated & remanded, 515 U.S. 737 
(1995), on remand, 936 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. La. 1996), appeal dismissed as moot, 518 U.S. 1014 
(1996)); New York (Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d mem., 522 U.S. 801 
(1997)); North Carolina (517 U.S. 899 (1996)); Texas (Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996)); and 
Virginia (Moon v. Meadows, 952 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1997)).  State legislative plans have been 
struck down in three states wholly covered by Section 5: Alabama (Kelley v. Bennett, 96 F. Supp. 
2d 1301 (M.D. Ala. 2000), vacated & remanded on other grounds sub nom. Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 
U.S. 28 (2000)); Georgia (Johnson v. Miller, 929 F. Supp. 1529 (S.D. Ga. 1996)); and South 
Carolina (Smith v. Beasley, 946 F. Supp. 1174 (D.S.C. 1996)).  Local plans have been invalidated 
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variety of reasons for this (both legal and practical), it adds further 
doubt to the proposition that the Justice Department implemented 
any maximization policy at all. 
2. Conservative commentators 
A number of conservative commentators, both before and after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller, have voiced similar criticisms 
about the Justice Department’s exercise of its preclearance authority. 
One of the leading critics is Abigail Thernstrom, a member of the 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and a Senior Fellow at the 
Manhattan Institute.  In her 1987 book Whose Votes Count?, 
Thernstrom presents a wide-ranging attack on the manner in which 
Congress, the Supreme Court, the District Court for the District of 
Columbia, and the Justice Department all have interpreted (or, from 
her perspective, twisted) Section 5.  She contends that Congress’ 
original intent, in 1965, was only to ensure that black citizens are 
shielded from discrimination when seeking to register to vote and 
cast their ballots on election day, and that Section 5 subsequently has 
been wrongfully “reshaped into an instrument for affirmative action 
in the electoral sphere.”126  She believes that the right to vote should 
be viewed solely or primarily as a right of individuals to participate, 
and not as a right of groups to obtain fair or effective representation, 
and that Section 5 has ventured much too far into the sphere of 
group rights in redistributing political power between white and 
minority citizens.127 
 
for three covered jurisdictions: Clark v. Putnam County, 293 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2002); Wilson v. 
Mayor & Bd. of Alderman, 135 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1998); Prince v. Horry County Council, No. 
4:97-0273-12 (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 1997). 
 126. ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? 27 (1987). 
 127. Id. at 232–44. 
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With regard to the Justice Department’s enforcement approach, 
Thernstrom argues that Section 5’s dramatic shift from the usual 
federal model is acceptable only if the Justice Department casts itself 
as a surrogate court in reviewing submitted changes.128 But, she 
continues, the Department failed to live up to that standard either in 
the 1970s or during the Reagan Administration in the 1980s (under 
the otherwise conservative stewardship of William Bradford 
Reynolds as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights).  She 
contends that the Department was biased in its fact-finding.129  She 
also contends that the Department was biased in its interpretation of 
the Section 5 “purpose and effect” test and in its application of court 
decisions establishing the contours of that test.130  The bottom line, 
according to Thernstrom, is that the Department sought to 
circumvent or ignore the retrogression standard established by the 
Supreme Court in Beer in order to maximize the number of minority 
 
 128. Id. at 168. 
 129. Her conclusion in this regard is based primarily on two Justice Department objections, a 
1974 objection to an annexation by Charleston, South Carolina, and a 1981 objection to a New 
York City councilman’s redistricting plan.  Citing the Charleston objection and her review of 
some internal Justice Department memoranda relating to that objection, she contends that the 
Department has tended to view the information it obtains about submitted changes through the 
lens of a “get-the-racist-bastards” attitude. Id. Pointing to the New York City review, she contends 
that the Department has misused and manipulated statistical information regarding registration, 
turnout, voting patterns, and census population counts.  Id. at 181–83. 
 130. She argues that the Department stretched the purpose inquiry far beyond its proper 
scope by suggesting in objection letters that discriminatory purpose was established when 
jurisdictions refused to implement an available alternative plan that would result in a higher 
number of minority officeholders, though the submitted plans were non-retrogressive and thus 
complied with Beer.  Id. at 174–75.  She undercuts this criticism, however, by stating that the D.C. 
District Court had adopted a similar position.  Id. at 175–76.  If that was the case, then the Justice 
Department, insofar as it adopted this position, was properly carrying out what Thernstrom 
argues is its role, a surrogate for the D.C. District Court. 
She also maintains that the Department misapplied the effect test by selectively choosing 
which prior practice to rely upon as the benchmark in judging retrogression, and by misreading 
two post-Beer preclearance rulings by the D.C. District Court.  Id. at 176–80 (discussing 
Mississippi v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1979), aff’d mem., 444 U.S. 1050 (1980), 
and Wilkes County v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C. 1978), aff’d mem., 439 U.S. 999 
(1978)). 
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officeholders and achieve racial and ethnic proportional 
representation.131 
Thernstrom’s analysis is faulty for several reasons.  Most 
importantly, while the Justice Department acts as a surrogate for the 
District Court for the District of Columbia insofar as it applies the 
same nondiscrimination standards and burden of proof,132 Congress 
did not intend for the Department to act as a surrogate court in 
conducting its fact finding.  As discussed above, the sixty-day review 
requirement that Congress included in Section 5 has impelled the 
Department to conduct its fact-finding in a relatively informal, non-
judicial manner, and Congress has twice renewed Section 5 with full 
knowledge of the Department’s preclearance procedures.  For this 
reason, and because the very basis for assigning the administrative 
preclearance authority to the Attorney General was that he also has 
the adversarial role of defendant in Section 5 declaratory judgment 
actions, Congress did not expect that the Department would 
approach its preclearance decisionmaking with the same institutional 
neutrality expected of federal court judges.  As discussed infra, these 
features of the Section 5 statutory design have played an important 
role in the Department’s adoption of a vigorous enforcement 
approach.  But, as is also discussed infra, that approach did not lead 
the Department to engage in any pattern of improperly twisting the 
law or the facts to justify objections, as Thernstrom would have it. 
 
 131. Id. at 178, 189–90.  However, she also asserts that the Attorney General’s guidepost, the 
District of Columbia District Court, also followed a maximization approach.  Id. at 162.  See 
generally MAURICE T. CUNNINGHAM, MAXIMIZATION, WHATEVER THE COST: RACE, 
REDISTRICTING AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  (2001) (arguing that that the Justice 
Department implemented a maximization policy in reviewing redistricting plans in the 1990s). 
 132. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 
C.F.R. § 51.52(a) (2005). 
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B. Justice Department as Endorser of Discriminatory Changes 
The Justice Department’s enforcement of the preclearance 
requirement also has been challenged from the other side of the 
political spectrum, by civil rights advocates who have argued that the 
Department wrongfully has precleared changes that clearly were 
discriminatory.  Recently, for example, civil rights groups have 
decried the Department’s August 2005 decision to preclear a new 
Georgia requirement that voters must present a government-issued 
photo identification in order to vote in-person on election day.133 
The most comprehensive critique by civil rights advocates was 
issued by the Citizens’ Commission on Civil Rights in 1989, 
discussing the Reagan Administration’s enforcement of Section 5.134  
The report initially concedes that “[e]ven under the Reagan 
administration, Section 5 served as an effective barrier to the 
implementation of discriminatory voting law changes”135 citing the 
large number of objections to post-1980 redistricting plans.  Without 
explanation, however, the report then reverses itself and contends 
that “under the Reagan administration the Justice Department 
defaulted on effective Section 5 enforcement.”136  The report attempts 
to demonstrate this by noting that the objection rate (the number of 
objected-to changes divided by the number of submitted changes) 
was lower during the Reagan years (from 1981 through 1987) than 
 
 133. David J. Becker, Editorial, Reviving Jim Crow?, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2005, at A17; 
Carlos Campos & James Salzer, Suit Slams Voter ID Law:  Groups Brand New Georgia Rule an 
Illegal ‘Poll Tax’, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 20, 2005, at A1; Press Release, American Civil 
Liberties Union, ACLU Condemns U.S. Justice Department Decision to Approve Georgia Photo 
ID Law (Aug. 26, 2005), available at http://www.votingrights.org/news/?newsitem=18. 
 134. Frank R. Parker, Voting Rights Enforcement in the Reagan Administration, in ONE 
NATION INDIVISIBLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS CHALLENGE FOR THE 1990S 362 (Reginald C. Govan & 
William L. Taylor eds., 1989). 
 135. Id. at 374. 
 136. Id. at 377. 
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the previous decade (1971 to 1980).  However, the report’s own data 
undercut this argument since the objection rate also fell during the 
last three years of the Carter Administration when, according to the 
Report, the Justice Department was properly enforcing Section 5.  
The report further points to a number of submissions which, 
according to the Report, the Department wrongfully precleared, and 
points to the Reagan Administration’s resistance to incorporating the 
Section 2 “results” standard in the Section 5 analysis.137 
A different type of liberal critique was offered in the 1982 book 
Compromised Compliance.138  The authors contend that, when faced 
with potentially objectionable changes, the Department regularly 
negotiated with submitting jurisdictions to get them to adopt 
compromise changes that the Department then could preclear but 
which still were discriminatory (albeit less so than the original 
proposals).139  This was done, according to the authors, in order for 
the Department to minimize its interference in local policy-making 
processes and to encourage covered jurisdictions to submit their 
changes for preclearance.  The authors, however, cite no evidence 
that any such enforcement approach in fact was utilized. 
 
 137. As noted in the Report, the Reagan Administration at one point opposed incorporating 
the results standard in Section 5 analyses before ultimately issuing a regulation in January 1987 
stating that a “clear” violation of the results test would prompt an objection. Id. at 382. The Report 
contends that after the regulation was issued, the Reagan Administration then did not make 
vigorous use of the new authority.  Id. at 364. The Report also notes that on a number of occasions 
the Assistant Attorney General rejected recommendations by career staff to interpose objections 
and that the precleared changes then were challenged and found unlawful in suits filed by 
minority citizens.  Id. at 370.  Perhaps the most notable example was the Department’s 
preclearance of the post-1980 Louisiana congressional redistricting, which then was overturned in 
Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983), cited in Parker, supra note 134, at 378. 
 138. HOWARD BALL, DALE KRANE, & THOMAS P. LAUTH, COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE 
(1982). 
 139. Id. at 86–91. 
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C. Justice Department as Case-by-Case Problem-Solver 
According to several commentators, the Justice Department’s 
approach to deciding preclearance requests historically has been that 
of a neutral, nonpolitical problem-solver, acting in good faith to 
enforce congressional strictures against racial discrimination in 
voting. 
This point of view was articulated perhaps most clearly and 
directly by James Turner, a long-time career attorney and leader in 
the Civil Rights Division.140  Writing in 1992, Turner contended that 
the Justice Department’s enforcement of Section 5 has been governed 
by the principle of “case-specific analysis.”141  According to Turner, 
the Department carefully analyzes the particular, unique facts of each 
submission and bases its determination entirely on whether these 
case-specific facts demonstrate that the submitted change 
discriminates in violation of Section 5.  The Department’s 
determinations are not aimed at reaching any particular pre-
determined result and, accordingly, “a practice that is legal and 
proper in one jurisdiction may be illegal and improper in another.”142 
According to Turner, because the Department follows this case-
specific mode of analysis, the Department has not been swayed in its 
determinations by any philosophical or political bias.  Turner 
portrays the Department’s actions as those of lawyers simply carrying 
 
 140. A former colleague of the author, Mr. Turner served in the Civil Rights Division from 
the 1960s until his retirement from the federal government in the mid-1990s.  Beginning in the 
1970s and continuing until his retirement, he served as one of several Deputy Assistant Attorneys 
General in the Division, occupying the sole nonpolitical Deputy Assistant position.  He also, on 
several occasions, served lengthy periods as Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights 
(during transitions in Administrations from President Carter to President Reagan, President 
Reagan to President Bush, and President Bush to President Clinton). 
 141. James P. Turner, A Case-Specific Approach to Implementing the Voting Rights Act, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 296, 298 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 
1992). 
 142. Id. at 297. 
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out, on a case-by-case basis, the policy determinations made by 
Congress, and contrasts this with the approach followed by social 
theorists or scientists, who may advocate a particular theory of 
democratic representation or engage in critiques of democratic 
trends and models.143  In particular, according to Turner, the 
Department has not sought to use the Voting Rights Act to maximize 
the number of minority elected officials.144 
Other Civil Rights Division insiders have written in a similar vein 
as Turner about the Section 5 process.  Drew Days, III, who served as 
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights in the Carter 
Administration and later as Solicitor General in President Clinton’s 
first term, also contributed an essay to the 1992 collection in which 
Turner’s comment appeared.145  After briefly reviewing others’ 
critiques claiming the Department had done too little to protect 
minority voting opportunity or had done too much, he concluded 
that “what emerges from an assessment of the department’s 
enforcement of Section 5 . . . is a picture of generally balanced and 
judicious use of this ‘extraordinary federal remedy.’”146 
A more detailed examination of Section 5 submissions was 
undertaken by this author, in an essay published in 1998 regarding 
 
 143. Id. at 298. 
 144. Id. at 299.  Turner’s essay was a brief commentary on a longer, theoretical discussion of 
the Voting Rights Act written by a social scientist, and was not intended to be a detailed analysis 
of the Justice Department’s enforcement principles.  He based his conclusions entirely on his 
insider knowledge of the Justice Department decisionmaking process and did not offer any 
empirical evidence in support of his views, such as citations to specific Section 5 reviews or an 
analysis across multiple Section 5 submissions. Id. at 298–99. 
 145. Drew S. Days, III, Section 5 Enforcement and the Department of Justice, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 141, at 52–65. 
 146. Id. at 61.  Like Turner, Days’ conclusion is largely based on his insider-participant 
knowledge of the workings of the Justice Department.  Accord, Drew S. Days, III & Lani Guinier, 
Enforcement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 167, 171 
(Chandler Davidson, ed., 1984) (in reviewing changes submitted for Section 5 review, the 
Department’s “objective has not been to dictate any particular [electoral] result”). 
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the Justice Department’s preclearance reviews of redistricting plans 
adopted after the 1990 Census.147  Echoing Turner, the essay argued 
that the Department’s redistricting determinations “rested on a case-
specific analysis of the individual facts relevant to the particular 
[submitting] jurisdiction,”148 and relied on the Section 5 statutory test 
of discriminatory purpose and retrogressive effect and not on any 
policy of maximization or proportional representation.149 
However, in addition to contending that the Justice Department 
faithfully sought to apply Section 5 law based on the facts of each 
redistricting submission, the essay also observed that the Department 
had a well-developed point of view—sympathetic to minority 
voters—in considering how the Section 5 test was to be applied to the 
1990s plans, especially with regard to the issue of discriminatory 
purpose.  As noted above, the great majority of the Department’s 
post-1990 redistricting objections were based on discriminatory 
purpose and dealt with plans that were not retrogressive.  The essay 
noted that, in applying the Supreme Court’s long-established 
framework for determining whether discriminatory purpose should 
be inferred,150 “the Department of Justice took a broad or aggressive 
view of the purpose test.”151  In other words, the essay concluded that 
the Department was relatively tough on submitting jurisdictions, but 
not in a way that constituted an unreasonable or illegitimate 
application of the Section 5 test.  It is this perspective which is the 
subject of the remainder of this Article. 
 
 147. Posner, supra note 15. 
 148. Id. at 97. 
 149. Id. at 96.  To support these conclusions, the essay laid out in great detail the factors 
considered by the Department in making the purpose and effect determinations, and it cited a 
large number of submissions as examples. Id. at 98–110. 
 150. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68  (1977). 
 151. Posner, supra note 15, at 97. 
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V 
THE REAL STORY BEHIND  
THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 5 
A. Vigorous and Principled Reviews 
1. The meaning of vigorous and principled enforcement 
The thesis of this Article is that, historically, the Justice 
Department has enforced the Section 5 preclearance requirement in a 
vigorous and principled manner.  As demonstrated below, this 
vigorous and principled enforcement is reflected in the standards the 
Department has utilized to review submitted changes and the 
manner in which the Department has applied these standards to the 
facts of individual submissions. 
Overall, the Justice Department has utilized stringent 
nondiscrimination standards.  These standards have been fully in 
accord with relevant decisions of the Supreme Court and the District 
Court for the District of Columbia.  When a particular standards 
issue was not directly addressed by the courts or the scope of the 
court-enunciated standard was ambiguous—and the Department 
accordingly was required to exercise administrative discretion—the 
Department selected standards that both would allow for aggressive 
protection of the right of minority citizens to participate in the 
political process on a nondiscriminatory basis and were based on 
reasonable interpretations of the court-enunciated standards and the 
congressional intent underlying Section 5.  The Department did not 
adopt any policy of maximization or proportional representation 
and, indeed, the Department did not always adopt the most stringent 
standards the law might have allowed. 
The Justice Department has also, overall, applied the 
nondiscrimination standards in a tough but fair manner.  The 
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Department has sought to examine rigorously and closely the claims 
made by submitting jurisdictions to ensure that they were supported 
by the facts.  At the same time, the Department has not engaged in 
biased factfinding and relies on all the information obtained in each 
preclearance review to make the preclearance determination. 
At bottom, in exercising its administrative discretion in selecting 
and applying the nondiscrimination standards, the Justice 
Department has been guided by its knowledge of the history of 
pervasive discrimination in covered jurisdictions, its understanding 
of the present-day effects of that discrimination, and its belief in 
equal electoral opportunity for minority voters.152 
2. Framework for analyzing the Justice Department’s exercise of 
discretion 
As a matter of both logic and common sense, the requirement 
that preclearance reviews focus on changes in voting practices or 
procedures presented the Justice Department and the courts with 
three basic (but not mutually exclusive) approaches to making 
preclearance decisions.  These approaches provide a useful 
framework for analyzing the manner in which the Justice 
Department has exercised its discretion when making preclearance 
determinations. 
First, the Department and the courts could ask whether a voting 
change would improve or worsen the electoral opportunity of 
minority voters. 
 
 152. The conclusion that the Justice Department, historically, has engaged in vigorous and 
principled enforcement of Section 5 is intended to describe a consistent, overall direction of the 
Department’s enforcement efforts and is not meant to define a straight line that links every 
preclearance decision by the Department.  Whether the Department swung toward more or less 
stringent decisionmaking at particular times is not the issue here, and likewise the correctness of 
each specific Department decision is not the relevant question.  The one important divergence the 
article does make note of is the apparent use of partisan decisionmaking by the current Bush 
Justice Department.  See infra Part IV.A.5. 
02__POSNER______KELLY EDIT.DOC 11/1/2007  3:35:24 PM 
 
VOL. 1 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2006 
 
? 130 ? 
Second, when a change does not worsen minority opportunity, the 
Department and the courts could ask whether there are 
circumstances that de-legitimize the choice that was made where 
the jurisdiction lawfully could have adopted an alternative course 
of action that would have been more advantageous for minority 
voters (compared to the adopted course). 
Third, when a change does not worsen minority opportunity, the 
Department and the courts might ask only whether the jurisdiction 
lawfully could have adopted an alternative course of action that 
would have been more advantageous for minority voters, 
regardless of whether the adopted course was legitimate or not. 
The first approach was endorsed early on by the Supreme Court 
in the Beer and City of Richmond decisions, setting forth, 
respectively, the general retrogression standard153 and the special 
retrogression standard to be used in evaluating annexations.154  These 
standards, at least prior to the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in 
Georgia v. Ashcroft, were relatively straightforward in concept and 
therefore typically did not require the Department to exercise any 
discretion in filling out their meaning, and also were often 
straightforward to apply.  As a result, the Department’s retrogression 
decisions, to a significant degree, have flowed directly from the 
standards established by the Supreme Court, and thus provide 
somewhat limited guidance on the question whether the Department 
has vigorously enforced the preclearance requirement.  Nonetheless, 
the Department’s long record of actively using the retrogression 
standard to interpose objections, and its resolution of the sometimes 
difficult and controversial questions that have arisen in enforcing this 
standard, support the vigorous-enforcement conclusion. 
 
 153. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). 
 154. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 371 (1975). 
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The second approach offered the Justice Department a much 
wider degree of decisionmaking discretion, both with respect to the 
choice of discrimination standards and with respect to their 
application, and the manner in which the Department used that 
discretion provides strong evidence in support of the vigorous-
enforcement conclusion.  Backed by its analysis of the relevant court 
decisions and the congressional intent underlying the Voting Rights 
Act, the Department over time identified a variety of circumstances 
that would de-legitimize—and thus render unlawful under Section 
5—a  jurisdiction’s decision to adopt a voting change that was less 
advantageous to minority voters than an available, lawful alternative.  
As discussed in the following sections, these included: discriminatory 
purpose; a “clear violation” of the Section 2 results test; a violation of 
the constitutional test for vote dilution (prior to the 1982 adoption of 
the Section 2 results test); a violation of another provision of the 
Voting Rights Act; or the fact that the existing redistricting plan 
substantially violated the one-person, one-vote requirement, leading 
to the conclusion that a fairly drawn, properly apportioned plan 
should be used as the benchmark (rather than the malapportioned 
plan) for judging whether the submitted change was retrogressive. 
The third approach, of course, represents the policy of 
maximization or proportional representation.  As discussed above 
and is further discussed below, the Justice Department has not 
utilized this approach in making its preclearance decisions. 
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3. Retrogression decisions155 
From the beginning, the Justice Department has been active in 
barring the implementation of retrogressive changes.  The period 
from 1965 to 1979 was one that was ripe for the adoption of such 
changes156 and the Department forcefully responded, interposing 
approximately 320 objections (over eighty percent of all objections 
during the period) to changes that would have worsened the 
opportunity of minority voters to effectively participate in the 
political process.157 
Numerous objections were interposed to retrogressive election 
method changes (changes from single-member districts to at large 
voting; and the adoption of majority vote requirements and 
provisions that precluded or limited the opportunity to single-shot 
vote in the context of at-large elections), retrogressive redistricting 
 
 155. To understand the full picture regarding the Justice Department’s preclearance 
determinations, it is important to note that retrogression objections often have also been 
accompanied by a determination that the change was motivated by a discriminatory purpose (this 
is particularly true of the retrogression objections interposed in the 1980s and 1990s).  McCrary, 
Seaman, & Valelly, supra note 14, at 82.  In that regard, the three-part framework set forth above 
for analyzing the Department’s preclearance decisionmaking may be said to be missing a fourth 
approach, i.e., when a change worsens minority opportunity, the Department and the courts may 
ask whether there also are other circumstances that de-legitimize the choice that was made.  
However, to understand the manner in which the Department has exercised its discretion in 
enforcing Section 5, the key distinction is between objections based in whole or in part on 
retrogression (the first analytic approach) and objections to non-retrogressive changes 
(potentially the second and third approaches). 
 156. Covered jurisdictions actively were seeking to alter their election structures so as to 
contain or turn back the tide of minority political power unleashed by the Voting Rights Act and 
the civil rights movement.  U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN 
YEARS AFTER, 1–10 (1975); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: 
UNFULFILLED GOALS, 1–3 (1981).  Furthermore, the scope of the Section 5 effect standard initially 
was uncertain and then, after the Beer decision in 1976, the articulated standard was new and 
untested. 
 157. McCrary, Seaman, & Valelly, supra note 14, at 82; see supra Table 2. 
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plans, and dilutive annexations, as well as to retrogressive changes in 
the procedures for administering elections.158 
The Justice Department carried forward the approach it 
established in the 1970s to precluding the enforcement of 
retrogressive changes into the next decades.  The Department 
continued to interpose a large number of objections in the 1980s and 
1990s based on retrogression.159  In particular, objections to at-large 
election systems, devices that would enhance the discriminatory 
effect of at-large elections, retrogressive redistricting plans, and 
dilutive annexations remained a staple of the Department’s 
preclearance decisionmaking.160 
The downward trend in the overall number of retrogression 
objections, which began in the 1980s and has continued into the 
current decade (Table 2), does not appear to be indicative of any 
lessening in the Justice Department’s resolve to identify and object to 
retrogressive changes.161  Instead, it appears to reflect the fact that 
jurisdictions have become more knowledgeable about the 
retrogression standard, and have been deterred from adopting 
retrogressive changes by the Department’s record of objections.162  In 
 
 158. Motomura, supra note 14, at 198 ff. (providing a detailed discussion of numerous 
objections interposed during this period); Complete Listing of Section 5 Objections, supra note 
15. 
 159. McCrary, Seaman, & Valelly, supra note 14, at 82; see supra Table 2. 
 160. This identification of the types of change that prompted retrogression objections is based 
on the author’s review of the Justice Department’s objection letters. 
 161. For example, as indicated in Table 3, supra, the number of redistricting objections based 
in whole or in part on retrogression was essentially the same in the current decade as it was in the 
1990s. 
 162. At least prior to Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003), it often was fairly easy for a 
knowledgeable attorney or voting consultant advising a covered jurisdiction to identify the types 
of changes that could prompt a retrogression objection by the Justice Department (such as the 
adoption of a majority-vote requirement or numbered posts by a jurisdiction that used at-large 
elections and had a significant minority population; or the adoption of a redistricting plan that 
changed a majority-minority district into a majority-white district). 
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addition, because a large number of jurisdictions in the 1980s and 
early 1990s switched from at-large to district elections as a result of 
the adoption of the Section 2 results test in 1982,163 and because other 
jurisdictions switched to district elections from the 1970s through the 
1990s to remedy Section 5 annexation objections,164 the number of 
jurisdictions adopting at-large elections, devices that enhance the 
discriminatory effect of at-large elections, or dilutive annexations 
that violate the City of Richmond “fairly reflects” test has significantly 
declined. 
As stated above, the extent to which this record of retrogression 
objections is probative of vigorous Justice Department enforcement 
is tempered by the fact that the retrogression test often is relatively 
straightforward to apply.  It simply requires a comparison of the new 
situation to the old, and the question whether an election method 
change, annexation, or redistricting is retrogressive often is largely 
determined by reviewing the relevant racial percentages and by 
analyzing the election results to determine whether and to what 
extent voting is racially polarized.165 
The retrogression standard, however, can sometimes require 
difficult and controversial decisions.  This has occurred typically 
where the pre-existing situation does not present a clear benchmark 
for evaluating the change, the reduction in minority voting strength 
is numerically small and thus may or may not be significant, or the 
reduction occasioned by one aspect of the change may be offset by an 
 
 163. PROTECTING MINORITY VOTERS, supra note 110, at 81–88; QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE 
SOUTH, supra note 6, at 385. 
 164. Complete Listing of Section 5 Objections, supra note 15. 
 165. Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim Of Its Own Success?, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1719 (2004); Michael J. Pitts, Georgia v. Ashcroft:  It’s the End of Section 5 
As We Know It (And I Feel Fine), 32 PEPP. L. REV. 265, 273–75 (2005); Posner, supra note 15 at 
98–99. 
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increase in minority opportunity presented by another aspect of the 
change.166  In these situations, the Justice Department typically has 
sought to apply the law and the facts in a manner so as to fully 
protect minority electoral opportunity.167 
The potential difficulties involved in applying the retrogression 
standard, at least in the context of redistrictings, recently have been 
significantly magnified by the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in 
Georgia v. Ashcroft.168  However, it remains an open question what 
 
 166. Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, 52 Fed. Reg. 486, 498 (Jan. 6, 1987), codified at 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b), repealed by 63 Fed. 
Reg. 24109 (May 1, 1998). 
 167. An example of the Justice Department’s stringent application of the retrogression test 
where the retrogression benchmark was at issue was the Department’s March 30, 1982, objection 
to Mississippi’s post-1980 congressional redistricting plan.  The new plan severely fragmented the 
black population concentrations located in the Delta area, but this also was true of the previous 
1972 plan, which had been precleared by the Department.  The retrogression analysis typically 
requires the Department to compare the new plan to the plan currently being used, so long as the 
existing plan is legally enforceable under Section 5.  Procedures for the Administration of Section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 C.F.R. § 51.54(b) (2005). Since the 1972 plan was 
precleared, there was a strong argument that the post-1980 plan was not retrogressive.  However, 
the congressional plan in effect on the State’s coverage date (November 1, 1964) did not fragment 
the black Delta population and, as a result, included a black-majority district.  The Department 
concluded that its preclearance of the 1972 plan was based on a mistaken legal premise, and that 
the post-1980 plan should therefore be compared to the plan in effect in 1964.  As a result, the 
Department determined that the new plan was retrogressive. 
An example of a retrogression objection where the reduction in minority voting strength was 
relatively small, and thus raised the question whether the reduction had any electoral significance, 
was the Department’s February 11, 1994 objection to the state legislative plans for the State of 
Alaska.  The Department objected to a district where the State had reduced the Alaskan Native 
voting age population percentage from fifty-six to fifty-one percent, although the Department 
agreed with the State that the reduction did not necessarily ensure the defeat of a minority-
preferred candidate.  Posner, supra note 15, at 99. 
The Justice Department has long recognized that retrogression compelled by compliance with 
constitutional redistricting requirements does not violate Section 5.  Revision of Procedures for 
the Administration of Section 5, 52 Fed. Reg. at 498.  However, the exact manner in which this 
rule is applied evoked some controversy when the issue was retrogression caused by a need to 
avoid the creation of an unconstitutionally race-conscious plan.  Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 
95–97 (1997). 
 168. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).  Depending on the facts of the individual submission, Ashcroft may 
require the Justice Department to determine whether districts in which minority voters do not 
have the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice nonetheless qualify as minority 
“influence” districts; the extent to which the new plan increases the number of such districts; the 
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the Justice Department’s application of the Ashcroft decision may say 
about the Department’s approach to enforcing Section 5 since the 
decision came near the end of the post-2000 redistricting cycle, and 
thus the Department’s experience in reviewing redistrictings in light 
of Ashcroft has been limited.169 
4. Preclearance decisions regarding non-retrogressive changes 
The Justice Department’s record of preclearance decisions with 
regard to non-retrogressive voting changes clearly demonstrates that 
the Department has used its discretionary authority to vigorously 
enforce the preclearance requirement.  As the concept of voting 
discrimination under the Voting Rights Act and the Constitution was 
defined and re-defined by the courts and Congress in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, the Department repeatedly was called upon to reconsider 
the circumstances in which a non-retrogressive change could be 
considered discriminatory under Section 5.  On each occasion, the 
Department opted for a standard that was both expansive and 
supported by reasonable legal arguments (though the Department 
did not necessarily adopt the most expansive interpretation that legal 
arguments might support).  In the middle to late 1980s and in the 
1990s, the legal bases on which the Department could invalidate a 
non-retrogressive change became, at least temporarily, well set, and 
 
extent to which the new plan increases or maintains the opportunity of the minority group’s 
elected representatives to exert legislative leadership, influence, and power; and whether the new 
set of circumstances and the effectiveness of the minority representatives offset a reduction in the 
number of electoral opportunity districts.  Id. at 482–84.  All of these questions are difficult and 
the Court provided little or no guidance on how to answer them.  See generally Meghann E. 
Donahue, Note, “The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated": Administering Section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act After Georgia v. Ashcroft, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1651 (2004). 
 169. The Justice Department has interposed only a few objections to redistricting plans 
subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft, and none has addressed the manner in 
which Ashcroft should be applied. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
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the Department then stringently applied the established legal 
standards in reviewing the facts of individual submissions. 
The Justice Department’s approach to reviewing non-
retrogressive voting changes has unfolded as follows: 
Pre-Beer: Before the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in Beer, the 
courts had not addressed the meaning of the Section 5 effect test 
except in the context of annexations.  Of some relevance was the 
Supreme Court’s 1969 decision in Allen v. State Board of Elections,170 
where the Court indicated that the concept of vote dilution is an 
integral part of Section 5.  In that regard, the Court linked the right 
to vote protected by Section 5 to the constitutional understanding of 
the right to vote set forth in the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment 
equal apportionment decisions.171  But neither the Supreme Court 
nor the District of Columbia District Court had addressed the extent 
or manner in which the “vote dilution” concept applied to the 
Section 5 effect test. 
The Justice Department concluded that discriminatory effect 
under Section 5 meant vote dilution, as indicated by the analyses set 
forth in its pre-Beer objection letters.172  Objections were interposed 
based on discriminatory effect both to changes that worsened 
minority political opportunity (and thus, in retrospect, were invalid 
under Beer) and to changes that either were ameliorative or did not 
alter that opportunity but violated the constitutional standard for 
minority vote dilution,173 as developed by the Supreme Court in the 
 
 170. 393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
 171. Id. at 569 (“The right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an 
absolute prohibition on casting a ballot.” (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964))). 
 172. McCrary, Seaman, & Valelly, supra note 14, at 32–33. 
 173. Id. 
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early 1970s in its decisions in Whitcomb v. Chavis174 and White v. 
Regester.175 
Thus, during the time when the law was relatively ill-formed 
regarding the meaning of the Section 5 effect test, the Justice 
Department adopted the broadest available, legally-acceptable 
concept of a discriminatory effect in voting.  A broader test would 
have been proportional representation, but it was clear that this was 
disfavored176 and the Department’s letters do not suggest that any 
such test was adopted.  At the same time, few objections were 
interposed to non-retrogressive changes based on discriminatory 
purpose.177 
Post-Beer initial responses: After the decision in Beer, it appeared 
that the Justice Department could no longer interpose objections to 
non-retrogressive changes based on the Section 5 effect standard.  
However, the Department soon identified new bases for concluding 
that such changes potentially could be barred by Section 5. 
First, the Justice Department concluded that it could continue to 
apply the constitutional test for vote dilution,178 based on the 
Supreme Court’s statement in Beer that “an ameliorative new 
legislative apportionment cannot violate Section 5 unless the new 
apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as 
to violate the Constitution.”179  The Court did not clearly explain 
 
 174. 403 U.S. 124 (1971). 
 175. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). 
 176. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149. 
 177. McCrary, Seaman, & Valelly, supra note 14, at 82. 
 178. This determination by the Justice Department is reflected in several objection letters 
issued after Beer was decided.  E.g., Letter from Drew S. Days, III, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil 
Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney Gen., La. Dep’t of Justice (Feb. 
7, 1980) (establishment of additional judgeships in City Court of Baton Rouge) (on file with the 
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy). 
 179. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). 
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what this meant, and arguments existed both for and against the 
proposition that this supported a continuing use of the constitutional 
vote dilution standard in deciding preclearance submissions.180  In 
face of this uncertainty, the Department adopted the interpretation 
that promoted stringent enforcement of the preclearance 
requirement.  Shortly thereafter, however, in 1980, the Supreme 
Court issued its decision in Mobile v. Bolden181 severely restricting the 
scope of the constitutional vote dilution claim,182 and the Justice 
Department accordingly abandoned use of unconstitutional vote 
dilution as a basis for interposing Section 5 objections. 
A second approach adopted by the Justice Department involved 
essentially a redefinition of the retrogression test, applying the 
decision by the District Court for the District of Columbia in Wilkes 
County v. United States.183  In that case, the district court determined 
that, in certain circumstances, retrogression may be found where the 
submitted change does not in fact worsen the electoral opportunity 
of minority voters compared to the opportunity that actually existed 
under the previous voting provision.  Specifically, the district court 
held that where a jurisdiction changes from single-member districts 
 
 180. The Justice Department’s interpretation appeared to reflect the plain meaning of the 
Court’s statement and, in addition, the Court, in a footnote in Beer, appeared to explicitly indicate 
that it anticipated that the constitutional issue under Section 5 would be decided by utilizing the 
constitutional law of vote dilution.  Id. at 142 n.14.  On the other hand, in adopting the 
retrogression test, the Court specifically rejected the district court’s use of the constitutional vote 
dilution test in applying the effect standard, and it would have been odd for the Court to endorse 
in its second breath what it had rejected in the first.  However, the most obvious alternative 
explanation for the Court’s statement also had problems.  That explanation was that the Court’s 
reference to constitutional violations simply was another way of referring to the Section 5 purpose 
standard.  But if that was what the Court meant, it could have simply said that, and at the time 
Beer was decided, the Court had not yet held that violations of the Equal Protection Clause 
require proof of discriminatory purpose.  The Court established the intent requirement in 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1976), decided a little over two months after Beer. 
 181. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
 182. Id. at 71–74. 
 183. 450 F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C.), aff’d mem., 439 U.S. 999 (1978). 
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to at-large voting and the pre-existing districts are severely 
malapportioned, an appropriate benchmark for judging 
retrogression is a hypothetical, properly apportioned districting plan, 
fairly drawn to reflect minority voting strength.184 
From 1980 to 1984, the Justice Department applied Wilkes 
County in analyzing and objecting to other jurisdictions’ changes 
from single-member districts to at-large elections, and also relied on 
the court’s holding in some of its redistricting objections.  A total of 
about 20 objections were interposed during this period where the 
retrogression finding was based exclusively on a Wilkes County 
analysis.185 
As the Justice Department considered whether and how to utilize 
the Wilkes County standard in its administrative preclearance 
reviews, it was presented with several legal questions about the scope 
and propriety of the standard.  The Department answered these 
questions, at least initially, by coming down on the side of more 
stringent enforcement.  The core problem was that the putative 
retrogression analysis endorsed in Wilkes County did not, in fact, 
measure whether minorities were worse off than before, but instead 
examined whether they were worse off compared to what the pre-
 
 184. Id. at 1178.  The case concerned the method of electing the county board of 
commissioners and the county school board, in a county that was 43 percent black in voting age 
population.  After Georgia became covered by Section 5, both bodies changed from electing four 
members from districts and one at-large to electing all five members at large.  Prior to the 
changes, both bodies used the same districting plan.  No district had a black majority in voting 
age population, and the two districts with the highest black percentages were both 46 percent 
black in voting age population.  Thus, the district court found that abandoning these districts in 
favor of at-large voting had only a modest retrogressive effect on black voters.  Id. at 1176.  
However, the districts were grossly malapportioned (with a top-to-bottom deviation of 128 
percent), and the court found that a properly apportioned plan likely would include at least one 
district that would be about 71 percent black in total population.  Using this hypothetical plan as 
the benchmark, the court found that the change to at-large voting had a significant retrogressive 
effect on black electoral opportunity.  Id. at 1175–76. 
 185. This statistic is based on the author’s review of the Justice Department’s objection letters. 
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existing situation might or should have been.  Arguably, the 
Department had no choice but to apply the Wilkes County rationale 
to other jurisdictions which, like the elective bodies in Wilkes 
County, were changing from severely malapportioned districts to at-
large voting, since the Department owes substantial deference to the 
district court’s preclearance decisions.186  However, as noted, the 
Department also expanded the application of the Wilkes County 
rationale to the analysis of some redistricting plans. This was logical 
up to a point (if severely malapportioned districts may not be the 
benchmark for evaluating one type of change, it would seem that 
they should not be used as the benchmark for evaluating other types 
of changes).  But this use of Wilkes County had the potential to read 
the retrogression requirement completely out of redistricting reviews 
since almost all redistricting submissions involve existing plans that 
are malapportioned.  The Department continued to use the Wilkes 
County standard after the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in City of 
Lockhart v. United States,187 which inferentially raised, but did not 
decide, the question of whether the Wilkes County standard was 
incorrect.188  After 1984, however, the Department almost completely 
stopped citing Wilkes County in its objection letters.189 
Post-Beer discriminatory purpose: Beginning in the early 1980s, 
and continuing with increasing force into the 1990s, the Justice 
Department vigorously applied the purpose test to the review of non-
 
 186. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 
C.F.R. § 51.52(a) (2005) . 
 187. 460 U.S. 125 (1983). 
 188. In Lockhart, the Court held that the fact that an existing practice is unlawful under state 
law does not preclude it from being used as the benchmark for judging retrogression.  Id. at 132–
33. 
 189. It should be noted that in over half of the Wilkes County objections, the Department also 
based the objection on discriminatory purpose. 450 F. Supp. 1171, 1175–77; see also supra note 
184 and accompanying text. 
02__POSNER______KELLY EDIT.DOC 11/1/2007  3:35:24 PM 
 
VOL. 1 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2006 
 
? 142 ? 
retrogressive redistricting plans and election method changes and, as 
discussed previously, interposed objections to a significant number 
of these changes.190  This is the time period in which the Department 
interposed the great majority of its objections to non-retrogressive 
changes, and discriminatory purpose was the principal basis for 
interposing these objections. 
The discretion that the Department exercised in utilizing the 
purpose standard did not relate to its legal construction of the 
standard itself.  The Supreme Court’s decision in City of Richmond 
appeared to have conclusively held that the Section 5 purpose 
standard was co-extensive with the purpose standard under the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and that a racially motivated, 
non-retrogressive change was invalid under Section 5.191  Thereafter, 
the District of Columbia District Court confirmed this reading of 
City of Richmond in its 1982 decision in Busbee v. Smith,192 and the 
Supreme Court again rejected the argument that the Section 5 
purpose test only covered retrogressive purpose in its 1987 decision 
in City of Pleasant Grove v. United States.193 
Instead, the vigorous nature of the Justice Department’s 
enforcement owed to the manner in which the Department applied 
the purpose standard to the information presented in each 
 
 190. See supra Tables 2 and 3; see also supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text (discussing 
the Justice Department’s election method objections). 
 191. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 378 (1975). 
 192. 549 F. Supp. 494, 516 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem., 459 U.S. 1166 (1983).  On appeal, the 
State of Georgia specifically presented the question decided in Bossier Parish II, whether the 
Section 5 purpose standard only bars the implementation of voting changes motivated by an 
intent to cause retrogression.  Jur. St., No. 82-845, at 1 (Oct. Term 1982).  While the Court’s 
summary affirmance did not decide this issue, it required the District Court for the District of 
Columbia—and hence, the Justice Department in its administrative reviews—to continue to treat 
the Section 5 purpose test as being co-extensive with the Fourteenth Amendment definition of 
discriminatory purpose.  Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977). 
 193. 479 U.S. 462, 471 n.11 (1987). 
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submission.  In a variety of situations, the Department required 
submitting jurisdictions to put forward specific, credible information 
demonstrating the absence of discriminatory purpose.194  Further, 
consistent with the constitutional application of the purpose 
standard, preclearance was denied if any discriminatory purpose was 
present, even if nonracial justifications for the change also were 
shown.195 
Early in the 1980s redistricting cycle, use of the purpose standard 
to invalidate non-retrogressive changes received a significant boost 
from the District of Columbia District Court’s decision in the Busbee 
case.196  The litigation concerned the State of Georgia’s request for 
preclearance of its post-1980 congressional redistricting plan, 
specifically the manner in which the State had drawn its Fifth 
Congressional District in the Atlanta area.  The State argued that the 
plan was not discriminatory since it had increased the black 
population percentage in the district from fifty to fifty-seven percent, 
and the district had elected a black person (Andrew Young) to 
Congress in 1972 when the district was less than fifty percent black.197  
The district court held that the fact that the new plan was 
ameliorative did not insulate it from a preclearance denial, and 
refused to preclear it based on the strong evidence of discriminatory 
 
 194. The Justice Department’s aggressive use of the purpose standard to interpose objections 
to non-retrogressive changes is particularly notable given the difficulties that plaintiffs typically 
encounter in the litigation context in proving that a voting provision was enacted with a 
discriminatory purpose.  VOTING RIGHTS ACT EXTENSION, S. REP. NO. 97-227 at 36–37(1982), as 
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 214–15; Karlan, supra note 6, at 762–63; Pamela S. Karlan, 
Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 
111, 128–31 (1983). 
 195. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977).  
Accord, Texas v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 20, 27 (D.D.C. 1994); Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 516. 
 196. Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 516. 
 197. Id. at 511–13. 
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purpose.198  Although the case did not break any new legal ground 
and its explicit evidence of discriminatory purpose was not likely to 
be repeated in many submissions, the case provided a clear green 
light to the Justice Department to proceed with interposing 
objections to other ameliorative but racially motivated changes. 
The Justice Department’s first concerted use of the purpose 
standard to object to ameliorative changes involved its objections to 
redistricting plans by counties and other local units in Mississippi, 
beginning in 1983, the year after the district court’s decision in 
Busbee.  Thereafter in the 1980s, the Department objected to 
approximately 25 plans in Mississippi based solely on discriminatory 
purpose (and objected to about ten based in part on racial purpose 
and in part on retrogression).199 
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Justice Department expanded its 
use of the purpose standard by interposing numerous objections to 
changes from at-large to mixed election systems of districts and at-
large seats.  In the context of racially polarized voting, the adoption 
of mixed systems was clearly ameliorative, which could have been 
viewed as providing strong evidence of a nondiscriminatory motive.  
Nonetheless, from 1982 to 1998 the Department interposed about 
fifty objections to mixed systems based on discriminatory purpose.  
These objections often were based on the use of a majority vote 
requirement and/or an anti-single-shot device for electing the 
remaining at-large seats. 200 
 
 198. This included explicitly racist statements by the chair of the state house redistricting 
committee.  Id. at 500. 
 199. This analysis and the cited statistics are based on the author’s review of the Justice 
Department’s Section 5 objection letters. 
 200. Again, the analysis and statistics are based on the author’s review of the Justice 
Department objection letters.  See also the discussion of these election method objections supra at 
notes 103–104. 
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Finally, in the 1990s the Justice Department interposed objections 
to over 150 redistricting plans based on discriminatory purpose.201  
As this author argued in his previous study of the Department’s post-
1990 redistricting reviews, these objections reflected the view that 
where a plan substantially minimized minority voting strength, and 
that minimization was not required by adherence to traditional race-
neutral districting principles, the jurisdiction bore the burden of 
demonstrating through specific evidence that discriminatory purpose 
did not play a role in the selection of the district lines.202 
Objections based on Section 2 or other Voting Rights Act 
provisions: Congress’ 1982 amendment to Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act, reviving the standard for vote dilution used by the courts 
in Fourteenth Amendment litigation prior to the Mobile v. Bolden 
decision, raised anew the question whether this standard should be 
incorporated into Section 5 reviews.  Reasonable arguments existed 
on both sides of this issue—for example, some legislative history 
from the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments specifically endorsed 
incorporation203 while, on the other hand, the 1982 amendments did 
not include any amendment to Section 5 itself, which could suggest 
that the preclearance standard had not changed.  Ultimately, in 1997, 
in the Bossier Parish I decision, the Supreme Court held (by a vote of 
7 to 2) that an objection may not be based on a Section 2 results 
violation.204 
 
 201. See supra Table 3. 
 202. Posner, supra note 15, at 101. 
 203. See generally Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 497 (1997) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting in part and concurring in part); Revision of Procedures for the Administration of 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 Fed. Reg. 486, 498 (Jan. 6, 1987), codified at 28 
C.F.R. § 51.55(b), repealed by 63 Fed. Reg. 24109 (May 1, 1998). 
 204. 520 U.S. 471, 480 (1997). 
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Before the Supreme Court ruled, the Justice Department 
concluded that a Section 2 results violation would bar Section 5 
preclearance.  The Department interposed its first such objections in 
1983 and its last in February 1997.205  During this period, Department 
interposed approximately fifty-five objections based in whole or in 
part on the Section 2 results test, of which approximately eight were 
based solely on Section 2.206  In 1987, the Department revised the 
Section 5 Procedures to specify that a “clear” violation of Section 2 
precluded Section 5 preclearance.207 
Thus, faced with a choice between two overall courses of action—
apply the Section 2 results test in Section 5 reviews or not—the 
Department again exercised its discretion in favor of vigorous 
Section 5 enforcement.  However, by requiring that Section 2 
violations be “clear,” the Department did not select the most 
stringent standard available. 
From 1987 through 1994, the Justice Department also interposed 
a total of fourteen objections based on violations of other provisions 
of the Voting Rights Act.  These included objections based on the 
requirement that certain jurisdictions provide election materials in 
one or more languages other than English,208 the requirement that 
voters may receive assistance at the polls generally from any person 
 
 205. The Section 5 objection letters reflect that the first objections, based in whole or in part 
on Section 2, were in 1983 to redistricting plans in Copiah County, Amite County, and Oktbbeha 
County Mississippi.  The last Section 2 objections were in 1997 to a South Carolina state senate 
redistricting and the adoption of an at-large method of election for Camp Butner Reservation, 
North Carolina. 
 206. McCrary, Seaman, & Valelly, supra note 14, at 82. 
 207. Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, 52 Fed. Reg. 486, 498 (Jan. 6, 1987), codified at 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b), repealed by 63 Fed. 
Reg. 24109 (May 1, 1998). 
 208. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(f)(4), 1973aa-1a (2000). 
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of their choice,209 and the prohibition on the use of any voter 
registration test or device.210  All but two of these objections were 
based entirely on the statutory violation and not on discriminatory 
purpose or retrogression. 211 
These objections also represented an expansive interpretation by 
the Justice Department of its preclearance authority.  Neither the 
Voting Rights Act nor the Act’s legislative history address the 
question of whether objections may be based on violations of these 
provisions.212  Moreover, the relevant Department regulation 
(adopted in 1987) specifies only that these provisions should be 
considered in making the purpose and retrogression 
determinations213 and, unlike what the same regulation provided 
with regard to Section 2 violations, does not and did not specify that 
a violation of any of these other provisions could, by itself, trigger a 
Section 5 objection.  The objection letters do not explain the 
rationale underlying the Department’s interpretation of its 
preclearance authority; however, it would seem that the Department 
believed that public policy considerations counseled against 
preclearing a voting change that violated another provision of the 
Act.214 
 
 209. Id. § 1973aa-6. 
 210. Id. §§ 1973b(a)(1), 1973aa. 
 211. The statistics cited in this paragraph are based on the author’s review of the Justice 
Department’s objection letters. 
 212. For example, while the Senate Report for the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments 
explicitly addresses the application of the Section 2 results standard in Section 5 reviews, it does 
not address the parallel question regarding the application of other Voting Rights Act 
requirements in these reviews.  VOTING RIGHTS ACT EXTENSION, S. REP. NO. 97-227, at 12 n.31 
(1982). 
 213. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 
C.F.R. § 51.55(a) (2005). 
 214. Cf. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 485 (1997) (rejecting the United States’ 
argument that public policy considerations support denying preclearance to changes that present 
a clear violation of the Section 2 results test). 
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Judgeship objections: Of special note is the Justice Department’s 
use of the purpose and Section 2 standards to interpose objections to 
the creation of additional elected judgeship positions.  From 1988 to 
1994, the Department interposed Section 5 objections to the creation 
of additional judgeships, at the trial and appellate court levels, in the 
state courts of Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, 
North Carolina, and Texas.215 
The Department did not contend that the additional positions 
themselves were discriminatory, and the establishment of the new 
positions did not work any change in the underlying method of 
election.  However, the Supreme Court ruled in 1983 that when  new 
elective positions are added to a pre-existing body, the preclearance 
review of the new positions should include consideration of the pre-
existing, underlying election system.216  The Department applied this 
holding to the establishment of additional judgeship positions, all 
elected at large, and interposed objections based most often on a 
combination of discriminatory purpose and Section 2 violations, and 
in a few instances based solely on Section 2.217 
5. Decline in the number of objections since the mid-1990s and 
enforcement by the Bush Justice Department 
The sharp decline in the number of Justice Department 
objections beginning in the mid-1990s (Table 1) appears to be 
mostly—if not almost entirely—the result of changed circumstances 
outside the control of the Justice Department.  Thus, the decline does 
 
 215. Complete Listing of Section 5 Objections, supra note 15. 
 216. City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 131–32 (1983). 
 217. This conclusion is based on the author’s review of the judgeship objection letters.  These 
objections ceased after several jurisdictions obtained preclearance of their objected-to judgeships 
from the District Court for the District of Columbia.  See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
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not, itself, suggest that the Department has altered its approach to 
exercising its discretionary preclearance authority. 
The decline, in part, is the result of the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in recent years significantly narrowing the Justice Department’s 
authority to interpose objections.  As discussed above, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bossier Parish II, along with its earlier decision in 
Bossier Parish I, eliminated the legal bases for interposing objections 
that underlay a majority of all objections issued in the 1990s, 
including a substantial majority of the 1990s redistricting objections 
(Tables 2 and 3).  Prior to that, as also has been noted, the Supreme 
Court indicated in Miller v. Johnson that it disapproved of the 
manner in which the Department was applying the purpose standard 
to ameliorative voting changes, which also may have had an impact 
on the Justice Department’s preclearance determinations. 
At the same time, covered jurisdictions recently have enacted 
significantly fewer discriminatory changes.  As noted previously, by 
the mid-1990s a substantial number of covered cities, towns, 
counties, and school boards had abandoned their at-large election 
systems, which resulted in the near-disappearance of the once-
frequent retrogression objections to at-large election systems, 
majority-vote requirements, anti-single-shot devices, and dilutive 
annexations.  In addition, the number of jurisdictions changing from 
at-large elections substantially declined in the mid-1990s, 218 which 
reduced the likelihood of new objections to mixed election systems 
even before the Bossier Parish decisions eliminated the bases for 
interposing objections to such changes. 
The fact that the Bush Justice Department has brought a more 
conservative perspective to the enforcement of federal civil rights 
 
 218. See id. 
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laws raises the question whether the Department, today, is 
continuing to vigorously enforce Section 5.  Though, for the reasons 
just articulated, the overall objection numbers do not appear to 
provide any substantial evidence of a shift in enforcement approach, 
there have been several notable individual decisions by the Justice 
Department that suggest that the Department has not  enforced the 
statute in a consistently vigorous manner.  As discussed in this 
author’s recent essay regarding the politicization of the Justice 
Department’s decisionmaking in the Bush Administration, the 
Department in recent years has precleared two highly controversial 
changes—the State of Georgia’s photo identification requirement for 
voting at the polls on election day and the State of Texas’ second 
post-2000 congressional redistricting plan—where there was 
substantial evidence that the changes were retrogressive.  These 
changes apparently were precleared as a result of partisan political 
concerns within the Justice Department, and not based on a good 
faith application of the law to the facts.219 
6. The question of maximization and proportional representation 
As explained above, the Justice Department actively exercised its 
discretionary preclearance authority to interpose numerous 
objections to election method changes and redistricting plans that 
did not worsen minority electoral opportunity.  These objections 
were based in part on the Department’s conclusion in each case that 
the submitting jurisdiction had available to it a reasonable alternative 
method of election or redistricting plan that would better reflect 
minority voting strength.  If the Department’s analyses had stopped 
there, the Department indeed would have been implementing a 
 
 219. Posner, supra note 16, at 14–15.  That essay also discusses the Justice Department’s 
apparent politicization of its review of a third prominent submission, which dealt with the post-
2000 congressional redistricting plan in Mississippi.  Id. at 13–14. 
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policy of maximization or proportional representation.  But the 
Department’s analyses did not stop there.  Instead, the Department 
interposed objections only when there was an additional set of factual 
and legal circumstances that de-legitimized the jurisdiction’s chosen 
course of action.  Furthermore, the Justice Department identified the 
types of de-legitimizing circumstances that properly could be relied 
upon by analyzing the relevant case law, congressional intent 
underlying the Voting Rights Act, and public policy considerations. 
Critics of the Justice Department (including, most particularly, 
the Supreme Court) have disagreed with the Department’s legal 
analyses with regard to the circumstances, if any, in which Section 5 
may bar the implementation of a voting change that does not worsen 
minority electoral opportunity.220  But determinations that the 
Department erred in its legal analyses do not and should not lead to 
the conclusion that the Department adopted a policy of 
maximization or proportional representation.  That conclusion 
would require evidence that affirmatively demonstrates that such a 
policy was adopted.  As discussed above, that evidence is lacking. 
B. Justice Department Reviews Conducted as Congress Intended 
What then is the explanation for the Justice Department’s long 
history of vigorous Section 5 enforcement?  Has it simply been the 
result of which particular individuals have happened to serve as 
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights and as the career staff in 
the Civil Rights Division?  Does it represent just another instance of 
“mission-creep,” operating over a period of several decades?  Has it 
 
 220. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
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resulted from some special protected status that voting rights issues 
may enjoy in the general equal-protection jurisprudence?221 
The answer is that, while all these factors have played a role, the 
most fundamental reason is that Congress designed Section 5 in a 
manner that actively promoted vigorous administrative enforcement 
by the Justice Department.  In part, this reflected Congress’ 
conscious determination that the new remedy had to be stringently 
enforced.222  And in part, the statute’s design may have promoted 
vigorous enforcement in ways not fully anticipated by Congress, 
though these were fully in accord with congressional intent.  Each of 
the eight distinct requirements and provisions of Section 5 described 
in Part I of this Article—unique or uncommon, or broad and all 
encompassing—have contributed to guiding the Department toward 
vigorous enforcement, and the administrative framework established 
by the Department to implement the statute also has played an 
important role.  As was noted recently in a more theoretically 
oriented discussion of decisionmaking issues, “the design features of 
both legal and organizational rules have surprisingly powerful 
influences on people’s choices.”223  The design rules of Section 5 are 
no exception. 
The first two requirements of Section 5 identified and discussed 
in Part I of this Article—the reversal of the usual federal relationship 
between national law and state and local enactments, and the 
assignment to covered jurisdictions of the risk of nonpersuasion—
 
 221. One longtime commentator on the Voting Rights Act previously posed the question why 
the Justice Department historically has taken a tough line in Section 5 reviews, and argued that it 
principally was the result of differences between voting rights issues and the issues that are raised 
in other areas of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.  Grofman, supra note 81, at 1243–47. 
 222. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334–35 (1966). 
 223. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not An Oxymoron, 70 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1161 (2003). 
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involve, a fundamental alteration in what constitutes the status quo 
when covered jurisdictions enact voting changes.  The status quo 
under Section 5 is the non-implementation of state and local voting 
changes, rather than implementation. 
This is significant because, when making decisions, people exhibit 
a clear bias in favor of the status quo.224  There would appear to be at 
least two reasons why this is true in legal decisionmaking: 
Procedurally, factors such as inertia, the existence of decisional 
checkpoints leading up to the final decision, and resource limitations 
work against altering the status quo; and, substantively, there is a 
legitimacy that attaches to the status quo that suggests it should not 
be changed.225 
Thus, comparing the Justice Department’s decisionmaking under 
the Section 5 regime to the what would have occurred had the Justice 
Department been required to continue to follow the usual litigation 
approach, it appears that Congress’ redefinition of what constitutes 
the status quo made it more likely for two reasons that the Justice 
Department would act to block the implementation of covered 
jurisdictions’ voting changes.  The first reason—the shift in the 
procedural considerations that affect decisionmaking (inertia, 
decisional checkpoints, and resource limitations) in favor of blocking 
implementation—is one that long has been recognized Congress 
anticipated and desired.226  The second—the enhanced legitimacy 
that Section 5 attaches to the non-implementation of voting 
 
 224. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, The Endowment Effect, Loss 
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991); William Samuelson and Richard J. 
Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decisionmaking, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988). 
 225. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 223, at 1180–81 (discussing explanations for the strong 
effects of the status quo).  In legal decisionmaking, the status quo serves as the decisional anchor 
or starting point.  As a general matter, decisional anchors or starting points exert a substantial 
influence on decision selections.  Id. at 1177–78. 
 226. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328. 
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changes—is more subtle and has not been identified as something 
that Congress anticipated.  However, it is fully consistent with the 
congressional intent to foreclose the implementation of 
discriminatory voting changes. 
The third distinct requirement of Section 5 identified in Part I of 
this Article—the reallocation of the judicial preclearance authority 
from local district courts to the District Court for the District of 
Columbia—also has had a significant influence on the Justice 
Department’s preclearance decisionmaking.  This is because the 
Justice Department, as a stand-in for the District of Columbia Court, 
must adhere to that court’s interpretations of the Section 5 
nondiscrimination standards, and the reallocation of judicial 
authority to that court was intended to make it more likely that 
judicial preclearance decisions would be made by judges who 
understand and sympathize with the problems faced by minority 
voters in seeking to exercise effective political power in the covered 
jurisdictions.  Thus, Congress sought to provide the Department 
with a judicial guide that would more likely point the Department in 
the direction of vigorous enforcement, which as we have seen, in fact 
is what has occurred in several important instances.227 
Fourth, the novel power-sharing relationship Congress 
established between the district court and the Attorney General has 
pointed the Justice Department toward vigorous Section 5 
enforcement in its administrative decisionmaking. 
As discussed in Part I, the Attorney General was made the 
administrative preclearance decisionmaker because Congress wanted 
to create an administrative mechanism that would permit covered 
 
 227. See supra Part IV.A.4 (discussing the impact of the district court’s decisions in Wilkes 
County v. United States and Busbee v. Smith). 
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jurisdictions to avoid preclearance litigation, and because providing 
for submissions to the Attorney General was the most obvious way to 
create an administrative short-cut since the Attorney General serves 
as the sole statutory defendant in Section 5 declaratory judgment 
actions.228  Thus, the preclearance administrative hat worn by the 
Attorney General is closely linked to, and is not in any way separated 
from, the hat he wears in Section 5 litigation as the representative of, 
and an advocate on behalf of, minority voters.  Congress must have 
fully anticipated that assigning both hats to the Justice Department 
would influence the Department toward carrying out its 
administrative decisionmaking authority in a vigorous manner. 
Congress also knew in 1965 that, as a matter of actual practice, it 
was choosing an administrative decisionmaker who likely would be 
deeply concerned about protecting the voting rights of minority 
citizens.  This was evidenced by the Attorney General’s record of 
bringing voting rights lawsuits in the late 1950s and early 1960s,229 
and the Attorney General’s advocacy in 1965 on behalf of the 
enactment of the Voting Rights Act.230  This approach was likely to 
continue in the long term since it was clearly foreseeable that the 
Attorney General would delegate the administrative preclearance 
responsibility to the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights 
which, in turn, would mean that the day-to-day work of reviewing 
and analyzing submitted voting changes would be carried out by the 
career staff of the Civil Rights Division, composed of individuals who 
 
 228. See supra Part I.A. 
 229. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 313–14 (discussing the Justice departments’ efforts to bring 
lawsuits). 
 230. See United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Sheffield, 435 U.S. 110, 131  (1978). 
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historically have been committed to opposing discrimination in 
voting.231 
Fifth, by requiring that administrative preclearance reviews be 
completed within a sixty-day period, Congress indicated that it did 
not expect that the reviews would be conducted using a judicial 
model of decisionmaking.  Thus, Congress did not expect that the 
Justice Department would act as a surrogate court in rendering its 
preclearance decisions, or that the decisions would be made with the 
full panoply of due process protections.  In other words, Congress 
did not expect that the Justice Department would seek to match its 
performance to that of an idealized, “neutral” decisionmaker. 
Lastly, by broadly requiring that all types of voting changes be 
subject to preclearance and by establishing an apparently 
uncompromising and all-encompassing “purpose or effect” 
nondiscrimination requirement (as well as by reversing the usual 
vision of what constitutes the status quo when state and local 
jurisdictions enact voting changes),232 Congress sought to create a 
“decisive” remedy against discrimination in voting.233  A “decisive” 
remedy on paper plainly required vigorous enforcement by the 
Justice Department in order for it to be a decisive remedy in fact. 
By pointing the Justice Department toward vigorous enforcement 
of the preclearance requirement, Congress did not, however, point 
the Justice Department toward biased or unprincipled enforcement.  
In other words, Congress did not create a system in which the Justice 
Department would render decisions based only on what it considers 
to be in the best interests of minority voters, without due regard for 
 
 231. See BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS 158–59 (1997) (describing the 
typical lawyer in the Civil Rights Division). 
 232. See supra Part I.A. 
 233. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 335. 
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the interests of the covered jurisdictions or without fair consideration 
of the information offered by the jurisdictions in support of 
preclearance. Congress limited the scope of Justice Department’s 
administrative discretion by specifying that the Department’s role is 
secondary to that of the District Court for the District of Columbia.  
Accordingly, the Department must justify its decisions within the 
framework for legal and evidentiary analysis established by the 
courts.  If the Department does not do this, jurisdictions may file suit 
and obtain relief.  Moreover, although Congress has not explicitly 
addressed the procedures to be used by the Attorney General in 
reviewing Section 5 submissions,  Congress extended Section 5 in 
both 1975 and 1982 with the understanding that the Justice 
Department had established a comprehensive set of procedures for 
conducting Section 5 reviews.  These procedures reflect  a 
commitment by the Department to basing its preclearance decisions 
on case-specific analyses of the particular facts in each submission 
and to making decisions to interpose objections based on due 
consideration by several levels of attorneys within the Department 
(including career supervisors and political appointees).  Lastly, the 
entity within the Justice Department that has the authority for 
conducting Section 5 reviews, the Civil Rights Division, has had a 
tradition of rigorous, fact-based lawyering dating back to the 
1960s.234 
On the other hand, the statutory and administrative design 
features that have promoted vigorous enforcement of Section 5 by 
the Justice Department do not guarantee that such enforcement 
always will occur.  Particular appointees within the Justice 
Department may, for ideological or partisan reasons, choose to 
 
 234. LANDSBERG, supra note 231, at 164. 
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disregard the role Congress has fashioned for the Department.  As 
suggested above, it appears this is what in fact has occurred, to some 
significant extent, in the current Justice Department. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
It has been said that “with great power comes great 
responsibility.”235  But responsibility to do what?  In Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act, Congress sought to establish an administrative 
preclearance procedure under which the executive officials charged 
with enforcement would vigorously defend and protect the right to 
vote of America’s minority citizens against all “subtle, as well as . . . 
obvious,” discriminatory devices.236  The fact that the Justice 
Department has done precisely that is not cause to sound a 
constitutional alarm, but simply indicates that the Department has 
acted in good faith in accord with congressional intent.  The Justice 
Department has been a trustworthy agent of Congress, and its 
performance in exercising the great power vested in it fully supports 
congressional extension of Section 5 beyond the August 2007 
expiration date and a ruling by the Supreme Court that the 
congressional reauthorization is constitutional. 
 
 235. This may be equally true whether the subject is world affairs or the affairs of a comic 
book hero.  Nora Boustany, A Young Writer Sows Her Own Seeds of Peace, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 
2005, at A13. 
 236. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565 (1969). 
